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(2) the timing of the second sourcing planning in relation to the wajor
Weapon System Acquisition Process, (3) the acquisition of technical data
rights, and (4) L/F implementation variables. The researcher proposes an
alternate Model based on the experiences of the JCMPO acquisitions. This
Model will, most likely, be more valuable to a Program Manager dealing with
the Aerospace Industry since it is based on aerospace acquisitions.
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The purpose of this study is to evaluate the Thompson-
Rubenstein Leader/Follower Second Sourcing (t-R L/F) Ilodel.
The Model is applied to four acquisitions managed by the Joint
Cruise Missile Project Office (JCMPO) . The study reviews cur-
rent DOD second sourcing acquisition policy and directives,
and discusses alternate second sourcing techniques with empha-
sis on the Leader/Follower technique.
The results of this research indicate that the T-R L/F
Model does not adequately address: (1) the competitive nature
of the Aerospace Industry, (2) the timing of the second sourc-
ing planning in relation to the Major Weapon System Acquisition
Process, (3) the acquisition of technical data rights, and (4)
L/F implementation variables. The researcher proposes an
alternate Model based on the experiences of the JCMPO acquisi-
tions. This Model will, most likely, be more valuable to a
Program Manager dealing with the Aerospace Industry since it
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For many years there has been a growing concern within
the Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) over the
constantly rising costs of acquiring and operating current
weapon systems. DOD testimony during the 1976 Appropriation
hearings brought out [42:1]:
— The then-estimated unit cost of the XM-1 tank was seven
times that of the World War II Sherman tank.
— The aircraft carrier Enterprise / in the early 1960s
,
cost nearly ten times more than the World War II Essex . .
.
— The unit cost of both the F-14 and F-15 fighter aircraft,
in the 1970s, were more than ten times the cost of the
early 1950s F-84F.
These rising costs can be attributed to many factors such
as increased capability, technological innovations, and
inflation. However, cost growth over the baseline (develop-
ment) estimate greatly contribute to these rising costs. In
recent testimony before the House Committee on Government
Operations, Jerome A. Stolarow, Director, Procurement and
Systems Acquisition Division of the General Accounting Office
stated [33:1] :
At March 31, 1979, there were 58 major acquisitions in
development and production and reported in the DOD
Selected Acquisition Reporting (SAR) System. These
systems had current estimated costs of $235 billion,
of which the Congress must fund nearly $127 billion,




The cost growth of $97 billion represents a 41 percent
increase over the development estimates. In light of the
above facts, there has been a concerted effort by Congress
and DOD to reduce cost growth in the Major Systems Acquisition
arena.
One reason often cited for cost growth is the lack of the
"...pressure of true price competition as a motivating force
to improve productivity and reduce contractors' costs...
[42:17] especially in the production of major systems. In an
effort to increase competition in production contracts, DOD
has been exploring methods to qualify two or more contractors
to produce a weapon system. Recently, DOD has sponsored
research into possible second sourcing techniques including
the Leader/Follower methodology. Under the sponsorship of
the Air Force, Charles W. N. Thompson and Albert H. Rubenstein
developed a Leader/Follower Second Sourcing Model. The purpose
of this model is to provide "the basis for decisions concerning
when and how to use the method" [34:ii].
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The basic objective of this study is to evaluate the
Leader/Follower (L/F) Second Sourcing Model developed by
Charles W. N. Thompson and Albert H. Rubenstein of Internation-
al Applied Science and Technology Associates, Inc. (lASTA)
.
This study will analyze and evaluate whether the Thompson-
Rubenstein L/F Model accurately identifies crucial variables
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or parameters so that a program manager may easily tailor the
model to his/her project, thus making it a viable management
tool.
In order to evaluate the model, this researcher will
explore the use of the L/F Acquisition Strategy as implemented
by the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office (JCMPO) . The cruise
missile, a strategic weapon system, is a small pilotless air-
plane, powered by jet engines that may be launched from land,
sea or air.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In light of the above general objective the following
research question was addressed:
What are the significant aspects of applying the Thompson-
Rubenstein Leader/Follower Second Sourcing Model (T-R L/F
Model)
?
In answering this research question, the following subsidiary
research questions were addressed:
1. What is the Leader/Follower Concept and what are the
critical factors attendant to its use?
2. What are the major features of the Thompson-Rubenstein
Leader/Follower Model (T-R L/F Model)?
3. What are the major features of the Joint Cruise Missile
Project (JCMP) that lend themselves to the use of the Leader/
Follower Acquisition strategy?
4. What are the critical aspects of tailoring the Thompson-
Rubenstein Model for application to the Joint Cruise Missile
Project (JCMP)?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information presented in this study was obtained from
(1) currently available literature, (2) telephonic and personal
13

discussions held with the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office
(JCMPO) personnel, (3) informal discussions held with various
Government (JCMPO) contractors currently involved in Leader/
Follower Acquisitions, and (4) contractors who hoped to become
Followers in proposed L/F JCMPO acquisitions.
The literature base utilized in this study was compiled
from current and proposed Department of Defense (DOD) acquisi-
tion directives and instructions, JCMPO Procurement Plans and
Acquisition Strategy briefings, Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange (DLSIE) , the Naval Postgraduate School
Library, previous theses, and a review of current publications
and periodicals.
E. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of this study is limited to major weapon systems
acquisition related to the Aerospace Industry and to buys of
major components of such systems. Specifically, this study
will focus on the second sourcing acquisition strategy of
Leader/Follower as implemented by the Joint Cruise Missile
Project Office.
F. LIMITATIONS
This study is limited in that the JCMPO Leader/Follower
Acquisitions explored in this thesis are on-going concerns
and in the case of the Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation
(DSMAC) buy, the acquisition strategy is in the planning phase.
Therefore, the complete cycle of planning, implementing and
14

controlling the Leader/Follower acquisition cannot be discus-
sed in terms of experience. However, it is the opinion of
this researcher that successful L/F implementation and control-
ling is heavily dependent on the planning phase.
G. ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout this thesis, it is assumed that the reader has
a basic knowledge of DOD contract language, methods of contract-
ing, and contract types. It is further assumed that the reader
is familiar with program manager concepts as utilized in the
acquisition of major weapon systems.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized in such a manner that the reader
can assess the Thompson-Rubenstein Leader/Follower Second
Sourcing Model in light of DOD policy and JCMPO implementation.
Chapter II presents the framework for making a second sourcing
decision stressing its importance as an acquisition strategy.
Chapter III presents the definition of the Leader/Follower
concept and factors that the program manager might consider
prior to attempting Leader/Follower implementation. Chapter
IV presents the salient characteristics of the Thompson-
Rubenstein Leader/Follower (T-R L/F) Model. Chapter V discus-
ses four Joint Cruise Missile acquisitions where L/F was used
or considered for use as the Second Sourcing Strategy.
Chapter VI discusses the advantages and/or disadvantages of
the Thompson-Rubenstein Leader/Follower (T-R L/F) Model in
15

light of the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office experience.
Chapter VII presents a modified L/F Model which reflects this
experience. Finally, Chapter VIII presents the conclusions
drawn from this research and provides recommendations for




II. FRAMEWORK AND DEFINITIONS
A. THE MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS
Todays Acquisition Process in the Department of Defense
(DOD) is directed and guided by the Office of Management and
Budget (0MB) Circular A-109, Major Systems Acquisitions, as
promulgated by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)
Appendix A presents a graphic representation of this process.
A-109 requires that the program manager develop an acquisition
strategy which addresses the possibility of maintaining compe-
tition through all phases of the Acquisition Process. The
Leader/Follower (L/F) technique has been recognized as one
possible method for establishing and maintaining competition
in production. Therefore, early consideration of second
sourcing techniques for production, such as Leader/Follower,
should be addressed at each major decision point. There are
four major decision points which require agency head approval
before program continuation.
The first critical decision point is the "Need Approval."
The Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) is an "assessment
of current or projected U.S. military capability to perform
assigned missions" [38:8] and its primary objective is the
identification of deficiencies, so that appropriate corrective
action may be initiated. At this point, it must be made clear
that the MENS does not identify how the deficiency is to be
17

corrected as it will be industry's responsibility to propose
solutions during Phase of the acquisition process.
With Secretarial approval of the MENS, Phase of the r
cycle. Alternative System Concepts Exploration, is initiated.
During this phase a program manager is appointed and the
program is established. The program manager's first respon-
sibility is to develop program objectives "...that set forth
the capability [in mission need rather than equipment solution
terms], cost, and schedule goals being sought in the system
acquisition program" [25:10]. Once the objectives are estab-
lished the program manager must develop an acquisition
strategy that will ensure the efficient and effective
accomplishment of these goals.
The acquisition strategy must be set forth in sufficient
detail so as "...to permit competive exploration of alter-
natives systems design concepts." [38:9]. The plan should
also address the program manager's intended use of competition
in the production phase, as this may have a direct influence
on the design efforts of the contractors. Acquisition Strat-
egy Planning is an iterative process and the Acquisition
Strategy will become more definitive as the program moves
through the acquisition cycle.
Current directives stress front-end planning and promote
the use of competition throughout the entire process. Phases
and I of the acquisition cycle are structured around design
competition. Phase requires that concepts be developed as
to how the need identified in the MENS can be accomplished
18

in the most effective and economical manner. Both industry
and Government laboratories are encouraged to propose their
solutions. The Defense System Acquisition Review Council I
(DSARC) reviews all proposals submitted and recommends to
the Secretary of Defense the most promising concepts for
further development. With the Secretary's approval and
reaffirmation of the need, the program moves into Phase I
of the Acquisition Cycle.
OFPP Pamphlet No. 1 describes Phase I, Competitive
Demonstration, as follows:
Competitive demonstrations are intended to verify that
the chosen concepts are sound, perform in an operational
environment, and provide a basis for selection of the
system design concept (s) to be continued into full-scale
development. Such demonstrations normally involve some
type of prototypes — these may range from a principle
end item or critical subsystem, to a limited and less
than complete development model [25:16].
The formalization and recognition of this phase was an
evolutionary process.
During the 1960s the DOD behaved as though choices
between technical alternatives could reasonably be
made solely on the basis of analysis and design
studies, and that once program approval had been
granted, the actual development and production of
the system would proceed more or less smoothly and
according to plan [31:4].
Current acquisition policies and directives are much more
conservative and recommend hardware validation as the basis
for selection between competing approaches.
At the completion of the demonstration phase, DSARC II
evaluates the test results and recommends to the Secretary
those contractor design (s) that should be awarded contract (s)
19

for Full-scale Development (FSD) and testing. When the
Secretary approves the DSARC II recommendations, he reaffirms
the need and the program objectives, and the program moves
into Phase II, Full-Scale Development, Test and Evaluation.
Current directives encourage competitive full-scale develop-
ment between similar or differing system design concepts
whenever it is economically beneficial to do so.
At the completion of FSD and testing, DSARC III reviews
the program and recommends production. It is at this point
that the competitive environment established in Phases O
through II might have to be abandoned due to the high cost
of maintaining two competitive designs not only in terms of
production costs but in terms of operation and maintenance
costs. Therefore, at this point one design is usually selected
for production. Historically, the selection of a winning
design tended to put the winning contractor in a sole source
position [2:360].
To a great extent this sole source phenomenon holds true
today. This has long been recognized by acquisition managers
as a problem. DOD Instruction 5000.2 states, "The program
manager shall also consider means to increase the possibilities
for competition during production" [38:14]. However, current
directives and instructions do not clearly identify methods
of maintaining competition in production, but, the program
manager does have several options to consider. The main
thrust of this thesis is to identify these options and how
20

one option, the Leader/Follower Strategy may be utilized to
achieve a competitive environment in production. Beforeo
discussing these options, the benefits of competition in
production should be discussed.
B. COMPETION IN PRODUCTION
1. Definition of Competition
Prior to the discussion of the benefits of competition,
it is first necessary to define competition. The economist's
definition is based on the concept of perfect competition.
This concept assumes that four conditions exist 1 8; 10-1]:
1. homogenous commodity
2. numerous buyers and sellers
3. perfect information about prevailing prices and bids
4. entry into and exit from the market can be accomplished
in the long run
These conditions are rarely met in the general business
environment but in major system acquisitions usually all
of these conditions are violated especially during production
buys of the system. To some extent, in the Government's view-
point, the competitive environment is maintained in the design
phase, with the encouragement of industry-wide conceptual pro-
posals. However in production, the design is generally highly
customized with only one producer capable of production and
one buyer, the U.S. Government.
Since perfect competition cannot be achieved in business-
Government transactions, the definition of competition can
21

be less stringently defined as a force which drives firms
to reduce costs and become more efficient in order to main-
tain its market share of the Government business. This
force might be described as "effective" competition. [9:1].
For systems which are currently produced by a sole source,
effective competition may be achieved by the introduction
of a second source to produce the system or, perhaps, by
merely the threat to introduce a viable second source.
2. Department of Defense Policy
A proposed change to the Defense Acquisition
Regulations (DAR) (formerly known as the A-rmed Services
Procurement Regulation (ASPR)) states [7:4]:
General Policy. It is the policy of DOD to compete
contracts for production with two or more manufacturers
when such competition is likely to result in lower
overall costs, improve quality, reduce production lead
time or other benefits.. .. A determination to obtain
production competition is an essential decision in the
development of an acquisition strategy for a particular
system, both at the prime and subcontract levels.
3. Benefits of Competition
Potential benefits to be derived from establishment
of a second source in production include [7:4J:
a. The achievement of cost savings,
b. A broadening of the production base to
(1) maintain a viable source in areas of advanced
technology.
(2) spread the effect of supply and demand fluc-
tuations on the industrial base.
22

(3) improve mobilization capabilities.
c. Facilitate North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
participation.
d. Facilitate the attainment of acquisition goals for
small businesses and disadvantaged businesses.
e. Improve technical performance of equipment.
f. Improve delivery times and ensure against delays.
g. Competition for the sake of competition.
The above cited reasons are often quoted in current direc-
tives and literature on competition, however the program
manager may further realize the benefit of increased con-
tractor responsiveness to program goals and objectives.
By studying the above cited benefits, it is apparent
that these goals may at times, depending on the particular
program, be in conflict with each other. This is particu-
larly true when considering cost versus the broadening or
maintaining the production base. At times, it may be more
economical to acquire a system from one company (the sole
source producer) however the extent to which industrial
production capability will be maintained is a decision not
totally dependent alone on the costs involved. This is a
widely recognized fact in the shipbuilding industry. There-
fore cost is a secondary consideration. Cost may also be a




If cost savings is the primary goal in establishing
effective competion then a cost savings analysis should be
conducted to ensure that costs savings will be achieved.
In studing various cost projection models, it was found
that this analysis is not an easily accomplished task. The
researcher has found that most analyses base their cost
savings estimates on the difference between learning curve
projections for sole source procurement and competitive
procurement of the system. For competition to be cost
effective, the estimated savings must equal or exceed the
initial start-up costs for the second source. In making this
type of analysis several critical assumptions were made by
the cost models:
a. Duration of the program (total life of the o- o
program)
b. The yearly quantity to be procured
c. The minimum sustaining rate (the minimum
production rate that permits a company to maintain a
production capability for a particular system)
d. The projected slope of the learning curves for
sole procurement and competitive procurement
e. The time it would take to qualify the second
source.
The first three assumptions are heavily dependent
on the stability of the program. That is, the estimated
cost savings will only be achieved if the program is funded
24

at the projected quantity rate for the planned duration,
this means the program must be consistently supported by
both DOD and Congress.
The fourth assumption, learning curve projections,
may be estimated based on industry averages for both
competitive and sole source procurements [22].
The fifth assumption is heavily dependent on (1)
the technical difficulty, (2) the timing of the second
sourcing decision, and (3) the method used to establish the
second source. Second Sourcing methods will be discussed
in Section D of this Chapter.
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
An indepth analysis of defense industries is beyond the
scope of this thesis. However, a program manager considering
enhancing or using effective competition in production should
be aware of the general characteristics of the industry in
which he/she will be dealing. As this thesis focuses on
the aerospace industry, the general characteristics of the
industry are discussed.
Any definition of the aerospace industry would be
arbitrary. However, for this thesis, the following definition
will apply [2:337] :
The most common definition, . .
.
, would include only
the suppliers of aircraft, missiles, space vehicles,
and such supporting paraphernalia as guidance systems
and special maintenance equipment.
25

The most striking characteristic of this industry is
the use of high technology, and there is, therefore, great
uncertainties concerning the product characteristics and
the cost of the product.
Because of these uncertainties and the large size of
individual defense and space programs, special institutions
[other than firm fixed-price type contracting] have been
created to shift from producers to the government what
might otherwise be intolerable financial risks [2:335].
By considering second sourcing techniques, the Government is
attempting to shift back to industry some of the financial
risks involved in the acquisition of major weapon systems
[2:366]
.
The Government is very dependent on the industry for
research and development. However, the industry does have
excess capacity and is, therefore, very competitive for
Government business especially in the design and development
phase of the major system acquisition process. Profits are,
generally, relatively low for this phase, because, in the
past, the designer/developer has seen himself as a sole source
producer and could capitalize on this position to recover any
profits seen as "lost" in the development phase. Therefore,
any attempt by the Government to use competition in produc-
tion is seen as a threat to their basic philosophy of doing
business [2:360-369],
Another aspect a program manager might consider is the
interest of the industry in a particular program. This is
directly related to the stability of the program and the
26

expected dollar value of the procurement. In general, an
interested aerospace firm will "lobby" both the Congress and
DOD to help ensure that a "desired" program is funded through
production. If the firm perceives that support is lacking
in either, then their interest will drop unless the technology
might have future possibilities [2:369-377],
D. SECOND SOURCING TECHNIQUES
1. General
Second Sourcing refers to the process of qualifying
a contractor other than the designer to produce a system or
subsystem. Once the program manager decides that a second
source should be established, he then must decide which
method of second sourcing will most efficiently and effec-
tively achieve his second sourcing objectives. Possible
options that the program manager could consider are £29:40-48]:
a. Technical Data Package (TDP)
3b. Form-Fit-Function (F )
c. Directed Licensing (DL)
d. Leader/Follower (L/F)
e. Contractor Teaming (CT)
f. Component Breakout
This section defines and discusses the methods the
Joint Cruise Missile Project Office considered in establish-
ing a second source with the exception of the L/F technique.
The Leader/Follower methodology will be discussed in Chapter III
27

2. Technical Data Package
Historically, TDP is the most well-known method of
establishing a second source. When the Government contem-
plates second sourcing using this method, it procures the
technical data from the designer/developer during the
development or initial production phases. This technical
package may be procured through the application of appropri-
ate technical data rights clauses in the design phase of
the system or by purchasing the rights from the designer
at a later time in the production cycle. This technical
data package is then used to solicit proposals for the
system or subsystem on a stand alone basis. When this method
is used, several conditions should exist [7:10]:
a. The Government does in fact have unlimited rights
to the data in order to avoid future patent claims and/or
copyright infringements.
b. A determination that the system is not so complex
as to require technical assistance from the designer,
c. The technical data package is accurate and
complete. This requires that the data package has been
validated by the Government as the Government assumes the
responsibility for inadequate and/or faulty specifications





This method of second sourcing does not require the
use of the technical data of other designers/developers.
The second source contractor is given performance specifi-
cations stating the required output. However, if the item
to be procured is a subsystem, then the contractor must
design the item so that it is interchangeable with the
original designer's item. This is the classic engineering
concept of the "black box." This method's major advantages
are [39:40]:
a. Detailed design specifications are not necessary.
b. The Government is not required to procure the
data from the original designer.
c. If the designer will not provide a complete data
package or license to another contractor to produce the item,
this feature is particularly advantageous.
The major disadvantages are [29:40]:
a. The Government must pay for a second design
effort.
b. If field maintenance is contemplated, spare parts
and personnel training must be considered as an additional
expense.
4. Directed Licensing (PL)
This method, like the TDP method, requires the trans-
fer of technical data from the designer to the second source
contractor; however, it also entails the transfer of
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manufacturing techniques and know-how of the designer to the
second source contractor [7:11]. A further departure from
the TDP method is that the designer is responsible for the
accuracy and completeness of the technical data package, not
the Government. Using this method, the designer is usually
awarded the initial Production Contract with the requirement
that he qualify a Government approved subcontractor who will
in out years become capable of competing for production
awards. Under this method, the designer is paid royalty
fees on each unit the second source contractor produces for
an agreed upon quantity and/or period of time. This method
would be used when the designer has proprietary data that
he is unwilling to sell to the Government.
E. CHARACTERISTICS OF A MODEL
1. General
The term "Model" or "Modelling" will be used
repeatedly in the following chapters. "A 'model' is a
simplified representation or abstraction of reality" [35:19],
It is usually simplified because reality is too complex to
copy exactly and because much of the complexity is actually
irrelevant to the specific problem. The purpose of a model
in the business environment is to help the decision-maker
predict the outcome of a specific decision before committing
resources and time to implement the decision [24:84].
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2. Normative Versus Descriptive Models
Normative models, sometimes referred to as analytical
models, prescribe the course of action that the decision-
maker should take in order to achieve goals most efficiently.
Frequently, normative models rely on algorithms to determine
the best alternative. An algorithm is a step-by-step process
which, when completed, will lead the decision-maker to the
optimal solution. Some of the most common normative models
used in business are linear programming, network models,
and inventory models.
Descriptive Models describe things as they are.
"Their major use in management science is to investigate
the outcome or consequences of various alternative courses
of action" [35:24]. It is important to note that their use
does not ensure that all alternatives will be examined.
Therefore, unlike a normative model, a descriptive model
does not seek the optimal solution but a satisfactory solution.
The most common descriptive models used in business decision-
making are Markov analysis, queuing models and all types of
simulation models.
Due to the complexities of the Major System Acqui-
sition environment, the relationships and interdependencies
of the variables cannot be reduced to quantitative equations
or steps that adequately reflect the realities of the pro-
gram. Therefore, descriptive models are most often used in
the acquisition environment. More specifically, simulation





To simulate means to assume the appearance or
characteristic of reality [24:84]. In terms of the general
concept of modelling, this means that there are fewer
simplifications of reality in simulation models than in
other models. There are no built-in assumptions as is the
case in most types of models. Rather simulation is a method
of approaching a problem. The simulation model provides the
framework within which the manager can conduct experiments
to determine the outcome as various variables are manipulated.
For an acquisition model to be an effective management tool,
it should define the variables, the relationships and the
parameters of the system.
b. Variables
Variables, when used in the simulation context,
are those characteristics that are common to all programs.
Variables may or may not be controlled by the program
manager. There are basically three types of variables [24:87],
(1) State Variables . State Variables reflect
the current state of affairs such as resources availability or
technical considerations.
(2) Decision Variables . Decision Variables
are used to effect a change in the state variables such as a
policy change may require additional resources.
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(3) Environmental Variables . These variables
are usually beyond the control of the program manager but
greatly impact the program.
c. Relationships
State, decision and environmental variables so
relate to each other that a change in one has an effect on
the other. It is the connection of these variables into an
integrated system that makes a model a true model rather
than an assemblage of facts. The definitization of these
relationships enables a manager to manipulate the variables
and determine the effect of the change.
d. Parameters
Parameters serve to "tailor" generalized variables
and relationships for use on a specific program. The use of
parameters allows a model to be effectively used by more
than one program. A program manager utilizing the model
must analyze the importance of each variable and decide
which variables are applicable to his/her program. A
simulation model is only useful if it permits the program
Manager to make better evaluations of the consequences of





The Leader/Follower second sourcing acquisition strategy
is defined in DAR [39:4-701]:
Leader Company procurement is an extraordinary procure-
ment technique under which the developer or sole producer
of an item or system (the leader company) furnishes
manufacturing assistance and know-how or otherwise enables
a follower company to become a source of supply for the
item or system.
Although the above definition has appeared in the DAR (then
ASPR) since 1964, the concept is neither widely understood
nor recognized by the title of Leader/Follower (L/F) . One of
the first problems this researcher uncovered was one of
definition. In the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office, the
concept of L/F includes the Directed Licensing (DL) technique
described in the preceding chapter. They do not distinguish
between L/F and DL since both require that the designer/
developer provide manufacturing assistance and know-how to
the developing second source. However, a major distinction
is that in utilizing a DL arrangement the designer/developer
(the licensor) receives a royalty fee for a specified number
of units that the licensee may produce. While in the L/F
method, the designer would be paid for the time period that
he gives technical assistance to the Follower. It is the
opinion of this researcher that this is a valid distinction
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and the methods should not be addressed as a single concept.
The major reasons for this are: (1) the question of Licensor
or Leader motivation to provide technical data and manufactur-
ing know-how to the Licensee or Follower, and (2) the question
of ownership of data rights. Therefore throughout this thesis




Once the decision is made to establish a second source,
the program Manager must decide which second sourcing technique
would be most appropriate for his/her program and particular
system or subsystem. In making this decision, the Program
Manager should consider several factors including objectives
of second sourcing, technical data rights, technical complexity,
reprocurement data package, motivational factors, political
considerations, and the extent of subcontracting.
2. Objectives
General management theory requires that the first step
in the decision-making process be the definitization of the
second sourcing objectives. L/F would be an appropriate method
as a means of [39:4-701]
:
a. assuring standardization of components and inter-
changeability of parts
b. assuring a source of supply
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c. establishing a competitive second source
d. meeting schedule requirements which could not
be achieved by one supplier
e. reducing technical risk.
3. Technical Data Rights
From interviews, the researcher observed that owner-
ship of technical data rights may be the most critical factor
to a Leader/Follower decision. If the Government has estab-
lished clear ownership rights to the data, then this factor
need not greatly concern the program manager. However if
the designer claims proprietary data rights which he will not
transfer to a competitor, then the program manager must closely
analyze the data to ensure that in fact the contractor truly
owns the rights. If the contractor does in fact own the data,





The L/F technique is designed to provide liaison and
cooperation between the designer and the Follower so as to
ensure successful transfer of highly complex technlogy [1:48]
.
Also, by introducting a second source, technical risk may be
reduced because now two contractors are attempting to "product-
ionize" a hand-designed bread boarded prototype which is one
way JCMPO anticipates cost savings over a sole source pro-
duction procurement. The use of L/F would be inappropriate if
36

the technology utilized in the system is widely known and
used in the industry [34:3].
5. Reprocurement Data Package
If there is (or expected to be) a reprocurement
package sufficiently complete to allow a second source to
effectively produce the system, then the more traditional
secound sourcing technique of TDP should be considered [34:9],
However, one of the benefits designed into L/F is to bring
a second source on line before a complete technical data
package is available to the Government, In addition, under
the L/F arrangement, the Leader is responsible for the techni-
cal data transferred to the Follower rather than the Govern-
ment assuming the responsibility for the accuracy and
completeness of the specifications [21:347].
6. Motivational Factors
one very distinct drawback to L/F is the natural
reluctance of the Leader to educate a competitor. Currently,
DAR states that conditions for use (underlining added)
[39:4-702] :
(a) the company possesses the necessary production
know-how and is able to furnish requisite assist-
ance to the follower.
A proposed revision to this section of DAR reads [7:4-702.2]:
(1) the leader company possesses the requisite production
know-how and is willing to furnish the necessary
assistance and technical data to the follower.
The change from "able" to "willing" undersocres the need
of the Program Manager to consider motivational issues.
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Therefore, the program manager considering the use of L/F
should plan to motivate the Leader, first, to accept L/F as
a second sourcing technique, and second, to motivate him
to implement L/F in a timely manner [3:2],
The necessity of motivating the Leader to accept
L/F is closely tied to the timing of the L/F decision. If
the decision to second source using L/F is made in the early
developmental phases of the program, then the program manager
can capitalize on the design competition by making a priced
out Leader/Follower option part of the source selection
criteria. This may also alleviate any problems that may
arise over technical data rights. Under the threat of non-
selection, the Leader would be required to prepare a Technology
Transfer Plan (TTP) which could be incorporated into the
initial production contract if the option is exercised [13]
.
However, the decision to implement L/F is not always
made before design selection. If this is the case, claims of
proprietary data will most likely impede L/F implementation.
To overcome this problem, the program manager might seriously
consider the development of an alternate design. This would
be a feasible approach if funding requirements for design
efforts by the second source is not considerable and standard-
ization is not a driving objective in the second sourcing
technique selection. If the designer perceives that the
Government is serious, he will most likely opt for L/F or DL
depending on the validity of proprietary data rights claims [16]
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The threat to develop an alternate source may work for sub-
systems or components. However, if the Government wishes
to establish a second source "prime" contract, then this tact
may not be feasible, as the cost to produce and operate two
separate designs maybe prohibitive [2:369].
Another avenue the program manager may consider is
guaranteeing the designer a specific percentage of the yearly
Production buy. However, this tact may reduce the competitive
potential of L/F if the quantity guaranteed is greater than
the Leader's minimum sustaining rate [19].
7. Political Considerations
The interest of Congress in major systems acquisition
is a reality and a major consideration for every program
manager. The notification of award of any contract over
$1,000,000 must be withheld pending notification to Congress.
Therefore, contracts involving millions and perhaps billions
are of ]ceen interest to Congress for this means considerable
Federal monies and resources are directed to the state of the
selected contractor.
In general. Congress favors competition as revealed
in the following dialogue between Senators Proxmire and
Chiles [23:12]:
Senator Proxmire: We need competition early, we need
it late. We need it at all points in a procurement
process, more competition than we have now.
...If you do not get that competition in early, you are
missing, I think, the principal value of competition.




However, the fulfillment of constituency desires ensures a
Congressman's re-election. A cynical observer translated
this to mean, "Competition is great except for a contractor
located in my state .
"
Therefore the make up of the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees and the House and Senate Appropriation
Committees should be closely analyzed by the program manager
as the "Power of the Purse" can kill required second sourcing
funding. Senior members of these committees wield consider-
able power not only in the committee itself but on the floor
of Congress as well. Congressmen not on these committees do
not have the time to adequately research each funding legisla-
tion and they take their voting cues from members on these
committees unless constituency interest dictates personal
involvement. A program manager who wishes to overcome this
Congressional tendency must be able to present a strong case
for the benefits of second sourcing such as projected cost
savings or deployment schedules which require a second source
in order to be achieved [32:44].
8. Extent of Subcontracting
From interviews with JCMPO personnel, this researcher
observed that if the decision to second source a system or
subsystem is made prior to design selection, the extent of
subcontracting utilized by the designer should be considered
prior to implementing L/F. If a major portion of the system
or subsystem is subcontracted, then requiring the designer
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to establish dual subcontracting sources may be the most cost
effective way to achieve the intended L/F objectives. The
critical decision criteria would be that additional projected
cost savings exceed the cost of implementing L/F.
C. LEADER/FOLLOWER IMPLEMENTATION
1. Procedures
DAR suggests three methods for establishing a Leader/
Follower contractural relationship [7:4-702.2]:
(1) Award of a prime contract for supplier to an estab-
lished source (leader) with the obligation to subcontract
a designated portion of the requirement to a specified or
competitively selected subcontractor (follower) and to
assist the follower company with that production quantity
(the educational buy)
.
(2) Award of a prime contract for supplies to the leader
company with the obligation to assist the follower, also
under direct contract with the Government for furnishing
of the required equipment.
(3) Award of a prime contract to the follower company
with the obligation to award a subcontract to the leader
firm, for the assistance required to bring the follower
into production.
The actual procedure the program manager selects will
depend on the driving objectives for establishing L/F. In
analyzing the three procedures, the researcher observed that
all three relationships encourage commonality of design.
However, procedures 2 and 3 appear to reduce the dependency
of the Follower on the Leader and are more appropriate where
the primary objective is assurance of supply or maintenance
of the mobilization base. Under these arrangements, one
interviewee suggested that the Leader does not see the
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Follower as the usurper of his business but rather "another
cost of doing business with the Govermnent . " Cooperation
rather than competition is encouraged. However, commonality
may suffer because the Leader is not responsible for qualify-
ing the Follower and the Government is the primary coordinator.
Procedures 2 and 3, also, appear to be more appropriate where
the Government is actively involved in the design of the system
as is the case in the shipbuilding industry [16]
.
2. Technology Transfer Planning
JCMPO personnel felt that the first step to successful
L/F implementation is the establishment of a definitive tech-
nology transfer schedule. The schedule should not only specify
the required date for Follower qualification but also inter-
mediate milestones so all parties concerned may judge the
progress of the technology transfer.
JCMPO experience, also, indicated that the Technology
Transfer Plan (TTP) should address configuration management.
Required turn-around times should be specified. Configuration
Management is usually the responsibility of the Leader even
after the completion of the Leader/Follower educational phase.
However the Follower should be a part of the configuration
management board in order to facilitate communication.
The TTP should also address testing requirements that
the Leader will perform for the Follower, if any. As with the





3 . Motivational Considerations
In order to ensure that the Leader maintains the
technology transfer schedule, the program manager should
consider the use of both positive and negative incentives.
Positive motivational factors might be:
a. Establish a contractural award fee relationship
which incentives the Leader management of the Follower.
Possible award fee consideration could be (1) Follower mile-
stone accomplishments, (2) quality of Follower's product, (3)
timely delivery, and (4) Follower's cost [16],
b. Base the Leader's portion of the first year's
fully competitive buy on his performance during the Technology
Transfer phase [16]
.
Negative motivational factors might be:
a. Tying progress payments to Leader/Follower
milestone accomplishments [34:17].
b. Require that the Leader meet the Follower's
delivery schedule. However, the Leader would not be paid
for these units until the Follower delivers [17:6].
c. Bad publicity due to a low award fee [16]
.
The program manager should consider the use of a
combination of both positive and negative motivators. The
use of positive factors alone will probably not achieve the
desired performance because the Leader's competitive position




In order to ensure that all parties concerned
iinderstand their duties and responsibilities, a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) should be prepared by the Government which
spells out the technology transfer schedule and the motiva-
tional factors. This document would be signed by the Govern-
ment, the Leader and the Follower before contract award.
4. Follower Selection
DAR requires that the Government retain the right to
approve the Follower as a condition for use [39:4-702]. The
Government may reserve the right to designate the Follower or
may require that the Leader competitively select the Follower,
If Full-Scale Engineering Competition has been maintained
through the design phase, the Government may designate the
"loser" of the design competition as the Follower. This
approach has a distinct advantage from the Government's view-
point because the "loser" understands the performance require-
ments and if the two designs are similar, the learning is more
pronounced. Therefore, the Follower (the "loser") would most
likely be "educated faster" than a contractor who was totally
unfamiliar with the project, thus bringing the competitor
(the Follower) "on line" sooner. However, for a competitor
to become the Follower may not be practical. This will depend
on the "loser's" desire to stay in the program.
A proposed change to this section of DAR reads:
"(2) the Government retains the right to approve the evalua-




Thus, removing the requirement for the Government to approve
the actual selection of the Follower. Selection criteria
may include [13:3-5]:
a. Technical Proposal — the proposal should adequately
convey an understanding of the Developer ' s design and should
identify high rish areas.
b. Past Experience — it would be beneficial if the
proposed Follower has experience on similar programs both as
a prime and subcontractor. One industry interviewee stated
that subcontractor experience should be carefully analyzed
because the ability to build to another company's drawings
will be essential to successful L/F implementation.
c. Program Management structure — the program
management plan should adequately address L/F interface con-
siderations. Implementation of cost/schedule control criteria
should also be addressed.
d. Financial Consideration — the cost of the Leader/
Follower implementation should be realistically priced.
However, one Government interviewee stated that the
Government should be actively involved in the selection of the
Follower and not just a "reviewer" of the selection criteria
because, if competition is the ultimate goal, the Leader will,
most likely select a Follower who is either technically "weak"
or sees himself as a subcontractor to the Leader. In either
case, the technology transfer will be slowed down and the
Leader's competitive position will be enhanced because he
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will "continue down the learning curve" as the Follower falls
behind. If the Follower is "technically weak" it will take
longer to "educate" him. On the other hand, if the Follower
sees himself as a subcontractor then he will wait for the
Leader's direction which will, most likely, be slow in coming,
thus "stretching out" the technology transfer phase.
The decision as to whether the Government or the
Leader selects the Follower appears to be dependent on three
factors: (1) the Government's contractual relationship with
the Leader, (2) the resources of the project office, and (3)
Leader/Follower compatibility. If the Leader is a subcontrac-
tor to the Government's prime contractor, then the prime
contractor is contractually obligated to select or oversee
the selection of the Follower. The Government does retain
the right to approve all subcontracts [20:7-700]. On the
other hand, the Government can direct the prime to subcontract
with a specified firm as part of its contractual obligations
but the Government hesitates to use this option because of the
other two factors.
It takes considerable resources on the part of the
Government's project office to draft the Request for Proposals
(RFP) and the selection criteria. It would take less time and
effort to review the Leader's proposal and selection criteria.
However, the Government does risk the possibility that this
"reviewing" will not adequately ensure that the Leader's RFP
and selection criteria are detailed enough to permit the
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potential Follower to "intelligently" submit technical and
cost proposals.
Another consideration is Leader/Follower compabibility.
If the Leader selects the Follower, it is hoped that they will
work well together. However, this objective may encourage the
Leader and Follower, as one industry interviewee inferred, to
come to some kind of agreement that will ensure that neither
contractor will "take over" the program by "low-balling" the
L/F competitive procurements. The Government can counter this
by guaranteeing the minimum sustaining rate to each. On the
other hand, the Government should include a clause which states
the Government may make a sole source award if one "... entity
is not acceptable based upon performance or price. . ."[17:8].
The possibility of low-balling is present regardless of
who selects the Follower. The best defense against it is
ensuring that both companies submit realistic prices.
5. Government'* s Relationship with Leader and Follower
The Government may assume a "reviewer's" role or take
an active aggressive role to ensure L/F compliance. If the
reviewer role is assumed, then the current traditional contract
administrative procedures would be deemed adequate with the
appropriate Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS)
Office assuming the responsibility for overseeing the L/F
implementation [3]
.
However, if an active role is assumed, then the
program manager would assign a member of his staff to oversee
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implementation. Both the Leader and Follower would report
L/F implementation problems to him if they can't be solved
in a timely manner at the local level [3]
.
6. Feedback Considerations
To ensure that L/F implementation is proceeding in a
timely manner, management theory dictates that feedback
systems should be established. The use of cost performance
reports required by the C/SCSC is one way to monitor
performance. However, these reports are only good if defini-
tive milestones are established and the progress reported is
in fact progress made. The Government should closely monitor
the L/F reporting elements.
Another monitoring device suggested by JCMPO personnel
would be the requirement that L/F progress be reported at
program reviews. This would be most effective in Joint Leader/
Follower Program reviews where the program managers for the
Government, the Leader and the Follower could discuss imple-
ntation problems and the means to correct them. This tact
would also provide positive feedback for successes in imple-
mentation. The elevation of L/F considerations to the program
manager level should have a positive effect on implementation.
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IV. THOMPSON-RTJBENSTEIN LEADER/FOLLOWER MODEL
A. GENERAL
DOD Instruction 5000.1 "Major System Acquisition"
states [37: c]
:
Each DOD official who has direct or indirect re-
sponsibility for the acquisition shall be guided
by the objectives of 0MB Circular A-109 . . . and
shall make every effort to:
1. Ensure that an effective and efficient acqui-
sition strategy is developed and tailored for each
system acquisition program.
In order to assist the program manager to develop his second
sourcing strategy, the Air Force Business Research Management
Center, Air Force Systems Command sponsored a study to develop
a Leader/Follower (L/F) Decision Model. Charles W.N. Thompson
and Albert H. Rubenstein of International Applied Science and
Technology Associates, Inc. (lASTA) presented a L/F model in
their final report [34:12-18]. The Thompson-Rubenstein
Leader/Follower (T-R L/F) Model is presented in Appendix B
of this thesis. Section B of this Chapter will describe the
salient characteristics of the model as presented on pages
12 through 18 of the final report. Section C of this Chapter
will describe other factors that the final report discussed
but were not included in the Model.
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B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODEL
1, General
The T-R L/F Model is a descriptive model which
identifies the factors (variables) associated with two
decisions: ". . .(a) whether or not to use (or consider using)
Leader/Follower; and (b) how to use it" [34:12]. The model
requires that a "preliminary analysis" be conducted to
determine if L/F is feasible and whether a more "detailed
analysis" is warranted. Once the decision to second source
using L/F is made, the Model addresses "how to use the L/F
methodology."
2. The Preliminary Analysis
The preliminary analysis consists of two parts. The
first part involves examining three factors: (1) program
objectives, (2) the characteristics of the procurement, and
(3) time. These factors are examined to determine if second
sourcing is desireable.
. . . While there may be several objectives [for second
sourcing] the most likely ones are achievement of some
advantage in the cost (of the production buy and
assurance of supply). These objectives are, in turn,
sensitive to the second factor, the characteristics of
the procurement, and particularly the size and the
schedule. The third factor, time, enters in at least
two ways: First, whether this decision is being
considered early enough to allow introduction consistent
with the time needed. There are other factors which
may affect this decision, the most important of which
is probably in the form of strong policy guidance [34:8].
Although the T-R L/F model structure does not
specifically address the visibility of the program, the
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final report which presents the model does address this program
characteristic stating [34:8].
Visibility of the program may serve to facilitate
(or impede) the effective use of leader/follower,
depending upon the nature of the support of the
procuring agency.
If the program is highly visible then the use of L/F may be
"evaluated" prior to its completion and the Program Manager
may lose some of his/her flexibility in L/F implementation
[34:B-6].
The final report also discusses program stability in
terms of projecting cost savings. If the quantities to be
procured or the duration of the program is uncertain, then it
may be difficult to
. , . estimate potential cost savings (the differnce
between cost of establishing a second source and the cost
advantage of competitive production procurement or to
introduce leader/follower early enough to meet schedules
[34:B-6].
The second part of the Model's preliminary analysis
is the Leader/Follower decision. This analysis requries the
examination of three additional factors: (a) commonality,
(b) the reprocurement data base, and (c) the willingness
and ability of the Leader and Follower (characteristics of
(potential) contractors)
.
a. commonality is an assumed objective if Leader/
Follower is being considered.
b. Reprocurement Data Package, the second factor,
"..*
. is probably the most critical determinant of the
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feasibility and/or desirability of leader/follower" [34:14].
If a "complete" package is available then L/F is not
necessary. On the other hand, if the package is so incom-
plete or the technology so innovative, the L/F may not be
feasible. "Only in the 'middle area' where the second
source can (only) be put in a position to produce and/or
compete through 'extraordinary assistance' is leader/follower
indicated" [34:15].
Appendix B of the final report also discusses the
question of rights in data [34:B-8].
Where the TDP does include (or would be required to
include to be complete) proprietary data (or know-how)
,
provisions for assistance (as required by leader/follower)
will need to include not only recompense for the time and
effort but also for the value of the proprietary informa-
tion provided. This is, conventionally, a matter of
licensing which may be considered either an alternate to
or an alternative form of leader/follower.
c. The characteristics of (potential) contractors,
the third factor. "... apparently presents few initial
problems in considering whether to use leader/follower ..."
[34:B-10].
The technical capabilities required for the Leader and
Follower are not significantly different from those required
by "non-leader procurements. : In the discussion concerning
potential contractor characteristics, the final report
states [34:B-11]:
While it is difficult to speak with confidence, based
upon a small sample and a limited interchange, it
appears to be the general impression of contractor
program personnel that leader/follower, where
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introduced, is just another cost of doing business, just
another condition imposed by the customer to meet some
important or other need. During the early stages there
appeared to be few if any noticeable specific efforts
upon the leader other than anticipation of possible
difficulties in transfer and loss of production volume.
3. Detailed Analysis
If the "preliminary analysis" indicates L/F is a
feasible approach, then a detailed analysis is necessary.
The detailed analysis consists, primarily, of examining cost
and availability (assurance of supply)
.
"The achievement of savings in the cost of the pro-
duction quantities requires, essentially, a comparison of
cost of sole source with cost of second . . . sourcing"
[34:15]. The cost of second sourcing to the Government are
administrative costs; cost of services provided by the
Leader to the Follower, and start-up costs for the second
source [27:15]. Potential cost savings due to competition
should pay for these costs to the Government if the objective
of L/F is "cost savings." "For programs with very large
quantities and extended production runs it is more likely
that cost savings will be realized" [34:15].
The availability (or assurance of supply) is the second
factor to be considered in the "Detailed Analysis." If the
quantities required by the Government due to deployment schedules
exceed the capacity of one contractor, then second sourcing
may be dictated regardless of cost. Other "assurance of
supply" factors to consider are [34:16]:
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. . . the facility 'vulnerable' to environmental
assault or local labor conditions; is the producer
capable of building up and maintaining the desired
production rate; is management stable and responsible.
4. How to Use Leader/Follower
If the Preliminary and Detailed Analyses indicate
L/F is feasible, then the model moves the user to the "How
to Use" section. The Model presents three major "How to
Use" factors: (a) Timing, (b) Form, and (c) Incentives.
The first factor. Timing, "... may affect the use
of Leader/Follower in several ways." The timing scenario
presented is concerned with "time-available" and "time-needed"
to accomplish the Leader's education of the Follower. The
"time-needed" to educate the Follower may be greater than the
"time-available" to be cost effective or to meet delivery
schedules. Early planning would help alleviate this problem
[34:B-8]
.
The second factor. Form, describes the three con-
tractual relations suggested in the DAR [39:4-702]. The
three contracting methods are [34:17]
:
. , . through a subcontract from the leader to the
follower, through separate prime contracts (with a
contractual provision requiring the leader to pro-
vice assistance) or even a subcontract from the
follower to the leader for assistance.
The third factor. Incentives, are directed to
assure "... that the leader provides the requisite
manufacturing assistance and know-how and that the follower
accepts it" [34:17]. A suggested incentive is to tie progress
payments to successful L/F implementation.
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The characteristics of this Model can be suimnarized
by reviewing the flow chart presented in Appendix B of this
thesis. The three major phases of the T-R L/F Model are:
(1) the Second Sourcing Decision, (2) the Leader/Follower
Decision and (3) Leader/Follower Implementation. All of the
factors described in the first phase overlap into the second
phase and will affect the L/F implementation.
C. OTHER FACTORS
1. General
The final report discussed two characteristics which
were not directly or indirectly included in the Model. They
are: (1) the characteristics of Procuring Agency, and (2) the
relation between Government and contractors. It is the opinion
of this researcher that these characteristics are important
to L/F implementation and therefore should be discussed.
2. Characteristics of Procuring Agency
This characteristic discusses the lack of Government
personnel experience in the L/F methodology. The agency
personnel interviewed by Dr. Thompson felt that the objectives
of second sourcing and various means of 'encouraging' the
designer to assist the follower is part of any experienced
contract administrator's background and L/F would not present
additional problems. Government personnel also indicated
that the introduction of a second source increased management
problems for the agency. "Program managers are inclined to
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favor a single point of responsibility, preferring, . . .
that the systems contractor worry about all of the technical,
cost, and scheduling problems" [34:B-14].
3. Relation Between Government and Contractors
"Where the prospective leader company has already
established its capability . . . [to] produce, the government
may find its options limited" [34:B-15]. If the contractor
has developed a proprietary position, then the Government
may have to negotiate a licensing agreement. However, if
the system is in the design/development stage and two or
more contractors are competing for design selection, then
a L/F option may be included in the design selection
Request for Proposal (RFP) [34:B-16].
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V. THE JOINT CRUISE MISSILE PROJECT OFFICE
A. LEADER/FOLLOWER ACQUISITIONS AND PROJECT HISTORY
This Chapter discusses four acquisitions managed by the
Joint Cruise Missile Project Office (JCMPO) : the Cruise
engine, the Reference Measuring Unit and Computer/Inertial
Navigation Element (RMUC/INE) , the Air Launched Cruise Missile
(ALCM) , and the Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation System
(DSMAC) . These acquisitions were selected for research
because Leader/Follower (L/F) was used or considered for use
as the second sourcing technique.
The Joint Cruise Missile Project is an outgrowth of Navy
and Air Force cruise missile efforts. In the early 1970s,
the Air Force initiated the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy
Program (SCAD) for the development of a medium range cruise
missile for use as a decoy. The prime contractor was The
Boeing Aerospace Company (BAC)
.
In 1972, the Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) was
established when the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed
that the existing long-range strategic and tactical cruise
missile efforts be combined and redirected to build and test
a prototype cruise missile that would fit into a submarine
torpedo tube envelope. Competitive development contracts
were awarded to General Dynamics (GD) , Convair Division and
LTV, Vought. The Navy selected the GD design for Full-Scale
Engineering Development (FSED) in March, 1976.
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In 1975, the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and
Engineering) (then known as Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E) ) directed the Navy and Air Force to
restructure their cruise missile programs to meet parallel
milestones and to maximize commonality of the warhead,
guidance, and propulsion systems. During this timeframe,
the Navy exercised an option to modify the GD SLCM design
for ground and surface ship launch capability.
B. POLICY STATEMENTS
By 1977, three distinct cruise missile projects were under
development: Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) , Surface and
Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) and Ground Launched
Cruise Missile (GLCM) . In September 1977, the Under Secretary
of Defense (Research and Engineering) directed that a
co-located joint office be established to manage the three
cruise missiles. He stated [41]
:
It is a matter of highest national priority, especially
in the light of the B-1 decision, to develop an air
launched cruise missile (ALCM) with optimum performance
and minimum cost and schedule delays. I believe we can
best accomplish those program objectives by conducting
a competitive fly-off between Boeing and General
Dynamics to determine which of their missiles will be
the ALCM to be flown on the B-52 .... During the
course of the competition we want to continue to
emphasize the component commonality between these two
missiles and with the SLCM and GLCM.
He further stated that the newly established Joint Cruise
Missile Project Office (JCMPO) would receive programmatic and
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fiscal direction from an Executive Committee (EXCOM) . The
EXCOM members are:
1. Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (Chairman)
.
2. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Engineering and Systems) (ASN (RE&S) )
.
3. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research,
Development and Logistics) (ASAF (RD&L) )
.
4. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO)
.
5. The Vice Chief of Staff Air Force
6. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis
and Evaluation) (ASD(PA&E)).
7. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
(ASD(C) )
.
The Charter for the Joint Cruise Missile Project charges
the project manager to:
1. ... maximize subsystem/component and software
commonality and quantity buy, to utilize fully joint
test and evaluation, to encourage subsystem/second
source competitive procurement, and to otherwise
derive maximum benefits from the management of several
cruise mis«ile projects for the successful management
and accomplishment of the project objectives. He has
broad authority and responsibility as specified in
DODD 5000.1 for planning direction, control and
utilization of assigned resources of the approved
program to meet Navy and Air Force requirement [43:3a].
2. Develop and tailor an acquisition strategy for the
total program. The strategy shall be directed to
program execution and then achievement of program
objectives in an economical, effective and efficient
manner. Technical, business, and management areas
shall be addressed in the strategy to provide a basis
for the integration of these areas in achieving the
program objectives. The strategy shall be expanded
and refined as the program progresses and provide the
basis for direction of the program and for assessment
of program successes in achieving the established
goals and objectives . . . [43: 3c (6)]
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3. Direct a procurement program that includes maximum
use of effective competition for achieving objectives
through the system acquisition process [43:3c(7)].
The Honorable William J. Perry, Chairman, EXCOM, stated
before the 95th Congress House Senate Joint Committee on
14 April 1978 [27]
:
Dr. Perry: We made two management judgments in the
course of this program that are of more than usual
significance. We have concluded that we should main-
tain competition during the production phase, and
we are exploring a Leader/Follower arrangement as a
management way of achieving this .... The main
reason for the competition, the main programmatic
reason as I see it, is to maintain the competitive
environment on the theory that we'll get better
designs and better cost performance if we maintain
the competition.
In a memorandum for the President, the Secretary of Defense
stated, : " I recommend that you approve the Cruise Missile
Program as a program of highest national priority" [40]
.
The President approved the Secretary's recommendation.
With Executive and Legislative support, the Program
Manager, Rear Admiral Walter M. Locke, developed an
Acquisition Strategy which included both design and pro-
duction competition. The next sections of this Chapter will
discuss the planning and implementation of the four second
sourcing acquisition strategies where Leader/Follower was
used or considered for use.
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C. THE CRUISE MISSILE ENGINE SECOND SOURCING STRATEGY
1. Second Sourcing Decision
Prior to discussing the Engine acquisition, it should
be pointed out that the second sourcing technique utilized by
the Project Office was Directed Licensing (DL) . However, this
researcher included the Engine acquisition in the study because
Leader/Follower (L/F) was considered for use and the problems
encountered during the technology transfer phase of the
contract are similar to problems a program manager might
encounter in attempting to implement L/F.
In light of the stated policy, the possibility of
second sourcing the cruise missile engine was first explored
in late 1977. Williams Research Corporation (WRC) had
designed and developed the F-107 engine which was to be used
by all versions of the cruise missile. The objectives for
second sourcing were [20:16]:
a. Capacity
WRC did not have the capacity to produce the
required engines to meet the cruise missile deployment
schedule. However WRC assured JCMPO that capacity could
easily be expanded so as to meet the required delivery
schedule.
b. Cost Containment
With the introduction of a second source, JCMPO
hoped to realize the benefits of competition to reduce or




A second source would reduce the risk of non-
delivery. If one company failed to meet delivery requirements,
for technical or economic reasons, the other company would
be capable of expanding its production capabilities to meet
required delivery dates. One Government interviewee also
stated that second sourcing reduced risk in that contractors
in a competitive environment, were more responsive to the
"needs of the customer" and thereby more easily managed.
JCMPO told Williams (WRC) it was the Government's
desire to establish a second source for the engine. WRC
informed the Government that they had proprietary rights to
the technical data and did not wish to sell these rights or
consider a Leader/Follower Second Sourcing arrangement. The
Government questioned the extent of proprietary data claimed
by WRC but knew that the determination of rights in technical
data and computer software would require extended investigation
which could take several years.
Therefore, the Project Office explored the possibility
of developing an interchangeable engine (Form, Fit, and Function)
and on 17 November 1977 the EXCOM for The Joint Curise Missile
Project Office (JCMPO) approved the development of the Alternate
Cruise Engine (ACE)
.
On 10 February 1978, a JCMPO notice was published
in the Commerce Business Daily requesting that an engine
producer capable of developing an alternate cruise engine
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contact the Project Officer [20:14]. JCMPO intended to release
a competitive Request for Proposals (RFP) by 31 March 1978.
However, Williams proposed that they competitively select
a licensee with Government approval, to be the second source
supplier. The decision to continue with the ACE development
was reduced to three issues: Risk, Schedule, and Cost. A
JCMPO second sourcing briefing stated [16]
:
Risk - [The] main difference between alternatives
is technical risk.
ACE would reduce technical risks associated
with design problems.
WRC License would reduce technical risks
associated with production problems.
— [There is] no reason to believe WRC engine has
inherent design problems. [However] , there is
concern regarding production.
Schedule - estimated date for achieving production
capacity.
WRC Licensee - January 1982.
ACE - January 1984.
One interviewee estimated that it would cost an additional
$30 million to develop the alternate engine (ACE) if the
Government refused the Williams licensing approach. In
light of risks, schedule and costs, JCMPO deferred the ACE
development program and licensing negotiations were conducted
with WRC. However, the "ACE RFP . . . should be released if






In August 1978, the JCMPO contracting officer and WRC
signed a licensing agreement (See Appendix C) . The Government
agreed to the following [19]
:
a. The Government will procure from the Licensee
only the quantity of engines that are in excess of WRC's
capacity or beyond WRC's ability to meet schedule requirements.
b. The Government shall procure the first 20 engines
per month from WRC; in quantities of 21-100 per month, 25
percent is guaranteed to WRC; and for quantities greater than
100 per month, 50 percent is guaranteed to WRC.
c. The exact quantity that the Government procures
from the Licensee will be determined by (1) cost/price com-
parison between licensor (WRC) and Licensee, (2) ability to
produce on schedule, and (3) the need to maintain dual pro-
duction capability in the interests of National Security.
d. The Government will pay royalties to WRC for the




The Project Office (JCMPO) indicated the decision to have
Williams (WRC) rather than the Government, select the licensee
was due to two factors. The primary reason was that Williams
needed to negotiate the licensing agreement. The other factor
was that it would require less effort (resources) on the part
of the Project Office (JCMPO) to review their selection process
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This was a consideration because the Air Launched Cruise Missile
(ALCM) competitive fly-off was underway. This was consuming
much of their time and by having Williams (WRC) select the
licensee, JCMPO felt less effort (resources) would be required
of the Project Office.
Even prior to the final agreement with JCMPO on all the
terms of the licensing arrangement, WRC proceeded to conduct
negotiations with prospective licensee contractors [20:16].
Williams (WRC) considered six companies in their source
selection process. JCMPO personnel stated that as WRC completed
a site survey with a company, a Government team would follow
and conduct its won site survey several days later. At the
completion of the source selection process, WRC wished to
award a contract to a totally unsuitable (in the Government's
viewpoint) contractor. The contractor WRC selected did not
have any experience in turbojet engine designing and was in
fact a diesel engine producer. The Government team, on the
other hand, wanted a contractor that was totally unacceptable
to WRC. By way of a compromise Teledyne CAE (TCAE) of Toledo,
Ohio, was selected by WRC and approved by the Program Office.
4. Technology Transfer
In order to implement the technology transfer, Williams
(WRC) was to [161
:
a. Provide "know-how" documentation which includes





b. Provide personnel to TCAE to assist in interpreting
and implementing these drawings.
c. Qualify TCAE as producer by fiscal year 1982.
Government personnel described the implementation of
the Technology Transfer as "at best, not an overwhelming
success." Currently, Teledyne (TCAE) is about a year behind
schedule and $5 million over cost. When this researcher
asked how this happened, the following reasons were given.
The reason most often cited was the lack of "negative
motivational factors" for Williams (WRC) to qualify Teledyne
(TCAE) . The licensing agreement essentially protects
Williams' competitive position, however; it does not provide
any reason for WRC to qualify TCAE except the threat of
terminating the licensing agreement, which WRC did not want
in the first place. One interviewee stated that considering
cost growth and schedule slippage, the alternative cruise
engine should have been developed, but this isn't a viable
solution due to time constraints.
Another reason often cited by the Project Office was
the failure of Teledyne (TCAE) to act as the Government would
expect a prospective competitor to react. When TCAE had
problems, they simply waited for Williams' guidance which was
slow in coming. Instead of contacting JCMPO, Teledyne would
try to work with WRC as a subcontractor with the basic philosophy,




The Project Office (JCMPO) also stated that much of
Teledyne's (TCAE) cost growth was due to the lack of technical
information provided in the Williams (WRC) RFP. The Project
Office stated they had not "adequately reviewed" the Williams
RFP because of personnel and time constraints.
The next point discussed was Government surveillance.
Three major deficiencies were described. Each contributed to
poor visibility of Leader/Follower milestone accomplishments
as prescribed by the licensing agreement and contract. The
first deficiency was that the Project Office had not envisioned
a coordinating problem between the various DCAS offices which
turned out to be a considerable problem. Two spearate DCAS
regions was handling the WRC and TCAE contracts and any one
DCAS region is neither organized nor funded to provide a single
manager for contract administration which would have provided
visibility over the two contractors' relationship. On-site
inspection of both facilities by a single manager proved to be
necessary for proper coordination of L/F implementation and
DCAS personnel are not funded to travel outside their regions.
The second deficiency was the failure to require
Williams (WRC) and Teledyne (TCAE) to report the status of the
technology transfer at program reviews. This allowed Williams
to "hide" their non-participation in the Technology Transfer
and, in effect, told Williams that Technology Transfer was
not a major Government concern. During this timeframe, there
were technical difficulties but Government personnel
67

interviewed indicated that Williams was "holding back"
solutions to these problems; thereby, putting Teledyne further
behind the learning process.
The third deficiency described was the lack of JCMPO
personnel which, again, contributed to poor L/F visibility.
Most of JCMPO personnel were devoted to the ALCM competitive
fly-off and those assigned to the engine acquisition were
responsible for technical monitoring only.
Currently, the Project Office is considering ways to
motivate Williams to comply with the licensing agreement and
the contract. JCMPO is taking a much more active role in
technology transfer surveillance but WRC is seen "in the
driver's seat" because the licensing agreement does not have
any negative incentives for Williams to perform and the
development of an alternate engine is not a viable consideration,
However, one interviewee stated that the threat of loss of
additional business may be a viable means of providing an
incentive for Williams to perform because the Project Office
is currently establishing a new project, the Medium Range Air
to Surface Missile (MRASM) . There is some controversy regard-
ing MRASM's need and adaptation to cruise missile technology.
However, procurement plans are being formulated and, at this
point, the Harpoon engine rather than the cruise missile engine
is being considered for use due to cost reasons and WRC's
failure to qualify Teledyne (TCAE) as scheduled. If Williams
wishes to reverse this planning process, considerable
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improvement in TCAE's performance must be realized. If for
some reason, the cruise engine were to be used for MRASM, it
is doubtful that the MRA.SM engine requirements would be
included in the licensing agreement since investigation into
Williams claim of proprietary data rights has shown that a
small percentage of the engine components were in fact
developed by Williams at company expense.
In general, this researcher observed a negative
attitude on the part of JCMPO personnel toward WRC and its
business practices.
D. THE REFERENCE MEASURING UNIT AND COMPUTER/ INERT IAL
NAVIGATION ELEMENT SECOND SOURCING STRATEGY
1. Second Sourcing Decision
When discussing the second sourcing decision for the
Reference Measuring Unit and Computer/Inertial Navigation
Element (RMUC/INE) (which are parts of the Cruise Missile
Guidance Set) some might classify it as Directed Licensing
(DL) , and other as Leader/Follower (L/F) . Still, others will
insist it is not second sourcing at all because eventually
two Litton divisions were designated as the Leader and the
Follower, thus a sole source procurement. It is the opinion
of this researcher that this acquisition utilized a second
sourcing strategy because the two Littion divisions did act as
competitors during and after the completion of Technology
Transfer. It is also Litton Corporate 's policy to encourage
competition between its divisions and Litton 's Corporate
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profit policy was suspended for this program [18:4]. In
addition, this acquisition strategy might more accurately be
classified as Leader/Follower because, although a licensing
agreement was arranged by Litton between its two divisions,
the Government was not directly involved in this negotiation.
The reason for non-Government involvement was that Litton
agreed that the Government would not be charged a royalty or
licensing fee. In addition, Litton agreed to the following
[18:3]:
The cost for disclosure associated with the technical
transfer to LSL [the designated Follower] of the
ability to build the RMUC and/or INE will not be
chargeable to . . . any Government contract.
Initial consideration of the Guidance Set as a
candidate for second sourcing took place in early 1978 [20:22].
However, the large number of components received from a
variety of suppliers meant "... the Guidance Set as a
whole was not a practical candidate for dual sourcing at
this time" [12:3]. The Project Office, in keeping with its
stated second sourcing policy, requested that the prime con-
tractor for the Guidance Set, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics
Corporation (MDAC) , investigate the possibility of second
sourcing major components of its subsystem. The RMUC/INE
produced by Litton Systems, Guidance and Control Division (GCSD)
was identified as the largest and most expensive component and
therefore the most likely candidate.
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The objectives for second sourcing were defined by
the Director of Business and Acquisition Division of the
Joint Cruise Missile to be [20:26]
. . . the reduction of risk in terms of cost, technical
performance and production schedule. The establishment
of dual sources for key subsystems/components has been
adopted as the primary means of reducing [these] risks.
2. Technical Data Rights
Following a 1974 competition, McDonnell Douglas was
one of two firms awarded a contract for the competitive
development and demonstration of the Guidance Set. In May
1975, the Government issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for
a single contractor to provide the Guidance Set. This RFP
required that the Government acquire unlimited rights to all
data. However, McDonnell Douglas (MDAC) could not comply with
this requirement because Litton GCSD refused to supply them
the requisite data on the RMUC. MDAC did, however, agree to
furnish all other data [20:22]. Due to the technical advantages
of its system, JCMPO awarded the contract to MDAC [20:22] and,
in so doing, the Government did not obtain unlimited rights to
RMUC.
3. Second Sourcing Techniques Considered
Two second Sourcing techniques were considered: Form,
Fit, Function and Directed Licensing [20:26]. However, Litton
GCSD was not willing to license a manufacturer because it
would entail making available to the multiple offerers GCSD's
trade secrets and proprietary data. Therefore, the Project
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office directed McDonnell Douglas (MDAC) to issue an RFP for an
alternate design, the Form, Fit, Function approach. While
the RFP was on the street, Litton Corporate, Litton Systems,
Inc., approached MDAC and the Government with an offer to have
Litton GCSD license at "no cost to the Government or MDAC"
another Litton division, Litton Systems Limited, Canada (LSL)
to produce the RMUC/INE. A detailed Life Cycle Cost (LCC)
analysis was conducted and this arrangement appeared to be
the most advantageous to the Government in terms of cost [20:27]
In addition to LCC considerations, it was estimated that Litton
GCSD would be producing approximately 60 units per month before
an alternate designer would be qualified as a competitor. The
technical risk was also rated much higher with an alternate
design since GCSD's design was proven. Therefore, the
Government agreed to accept Litton 's offer which is basically
a Leader/Follower strategy [19] . McDonnell Douglas cancelled
the Form, Fit, Function RFP. Singer Company challenged the
Government ' s/MDAC • s rights to cancel the RFP and claimed there
would be "no real price competition between the two Litton
entities since both are part of the same corporation" [13:3].
The GAO upheld the Government's position stating, "We find
no legal basis for an objection to the arrangement set-up by




4. The Memorandum of Agreement
The Government/MDAC and Litton positions were defined
in a Memorandum of Agreement (See Appendix D) . In the agree-
ment the Government and MDAC agreed to [18]
:
a. neither solict nor award any contract to another
contractor for the Cruise Missile Guidance Set Elements
utilizing current RMUC/INE technology.
b. pay Litton for LSL and GCSD capital expenditures
if the program is cancelled prior to the expiration of ten
years or if less than 4,000 units are purchased from Litton.
c. a minimum sustaining rate to be awarded to both
LSL and GSCD with the FY80 production buy split 60 percent to
GCSD and 40 percent to LSL. After the FY80 buy, competition
would determine the split.
Litton Systems, Incorporated agreed [18]
:
a. to insure that LSL and GCSD would separately price
their units without corporate direction, and corporate profit
policy would be suspended for this program.
b. there would be no licensing fees charged to the
Government or MDAC.
c. there would be no cost to the Government or MDAC
for the cost of technology transfer between GCSD and LSL.





The technology transfer began in October 1978 and by
September, 1979, LSL had constructed three RMUC's. GCSD
tested these units and qualified LSL as the RMUC/INE producer
[12:3-4]. One interviewee stated that this L/F acquisition is
a success because production unit prices have decreased and
the benefits of competition are being realized.
When questioned why the L/F acquisition strategy
worked for the RMUC/INE acquisition, major reasons cited by
JCMPO personnel were as follows:
a. The decision to implement the technology transfer
was a corporate strategy. Profits regardless of the receiving
Division, stayed within the Litton Corporation.
b. LSL did in fact see themselves as a competitor to
GCSD. If LSL felt GCSD was withholding information, they
immediately contacted JCMPO for resolution of the problem.
c. The JCMPO project manager designated a single
point of contact for L/F implementation within JCMPO. He
communicated to both GCSD and LSL that any problems with the
technology transfer would be immediately relayed to the JCMPO
monitor.
E. THE AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE SECOND SOURCING STRATEGY
1. System Description and Developmental Strategy
The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (USDR&E) directed that the Air Force and Navy
establish the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office (JCMPO) in
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order to efficiently and in a timely manner develop the Air
Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) [40]. The ALCM is [43:1a]:
... an unmanned self-guided subsonic air vehicle under
development for internal or external carry and launch
by strategic bomber and, as appropriate, other cruise
missile carriers for delivering nuclear weapons against
fixed land targets.
The charter for the Joint Cruise Missile Project (JCMP)
directed the Program Manager to:
a. Conduct the competitive fly-off between candidate
missiles, including operational tests with Strategic Air
Command crews, to determine which will be the air-launched
cruise missile to be flown on the B-52 and, as appropriate,
other cruise missile carriers [43:3c(l)].
b. Ensure the accomplishment of program, development,
production and support phases and test/demonstration programs
whick are planned to maximize commonality [43:3c(3)].
Therefore, a modification was made to the Boeing Aerospace
Company (BAC) contract directing that its SCAD program be
altered from a medium-range to a long-range missile. A
modification to the General Dynamics/Convair (GD/C) contract
was also issued for the design and development of an air
launched variant of their SLCM and GLCM. A competitive fly-off
would determine which missile would be designated as ALCM.
2. Second Sourcing Strategy Objectives
At this time, JCMPO, also, conducted an ALCM second
sourcing review. The objectives for second sourcing were
defined to be [20:18]:
a. shortening the time for delivery,
b. achieving economy in production.
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c. assuring uniformity and reliability in equipment
performance,
d. eliminating problems in the use of proprietary
data,
e. establishing additional sources of supply and
broadening the production base, and
f. effecting transition from development to pro-
duction to subsequent competitive procurement of ALCM.
A cost analysis examining various learning curve
projections for planned ALCM procurements from Fiscal Years
1980 through 1985 was developed [20:18], It was determined
that, unless a second source supplier was a qualified
production source by Fiscal Year 1982, he would be at such
a unit price disadvantage [using learning curve projections]
that he would not be able to effectively compete for the remain-
ing production contracts [20:18]. Projected Cost Savings
loolced especially good if the GD/C missile was the selected
ALCM design since the total quantity of the missiles to be
procured included the SLCM and GLCM planned acquisitions [9]
.
In light of the stated objectives and the requirement
to qualify a second source producer by 1982, the Leader/Follower
(L/F) Second Sourcing Strategy was determined to be the most
effective method to achieve these goals [20:18].
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3. The Leader/Follower Strategy
On 14 June 1978, the EXCOM directed that the ALCM
Fiscal Year 1980 production Request for Proposal (RFP) in-
clude two options for Leader/Follower Second Sourcing. The
first option required that the "loser" of the competition be
the Follower. The second option required that the "winner"
competitively select a Follower. The ALCM Procurement Plan
(PP) states [14:1] :
The overall objective of the competitive FSED [Full-Scale
Engineering Development] program is to conduct a develop-
ment and test program of the two cruise missile systems
(Boeing, Seattle, AGM-86 and GD, Convair AGM-109) with
the selection of one source of the government's option,
use of a leader/follower concept for production.
The RFP required that BAG and GD/C develop a
Technology Transfer Plan (TTP) . "The TTP will include a
proposed Statement of Work covering each offerer responsi-
bilities as a Leader and as a Follower" [13:3-5]. The
"Leader Company Procurement Option" was included as part
of the "Criteria for Evaluation and Source Selection."
This option was listed last in the elements for evaluation
with the statement, "The primary elements (areas) to be
evaluated are listed below in descending order of importance"
[13:3-5]. This researcher asked, "How did the Boeing and GD
Technical Transfer Plans (TTP) compare?" One interviewee
stated that the Boeing TTP was much more detailed that the
GD/C plan. When asked why, the interviewee inferred that
Boeing was interested in being the Follower if the GD/C
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design was selected. At the same time, GD/C felt they would
not be the Follower if the BAG design was selected since they
already had won the SLGM and GLGM contracts and the BAG design
was considerably different from these designs. However, the
interviewee did state that both companies had submitted
adequate Technology Transfer Plans and that there were no
problems with proprietary data claims.
JGMPO also considered ways to ensure that the tech-
nology transfer would occur in accordance with the "winner's"
TTP. Motivating incentives considered were [16]
:
a. Establishing an award fee to motivate Leader's
Management of the Follower.
b. Split the Fiscal Year 1982 quantity based upon
the Leader Performance.
c. Withholding progress payments if Leader/Follower
Implementation did not occur as scheduled.
d. Publicize a low award fee.
4. The Decision Not to Implement Leader/Follower
On 25 March 1980, the Secretary of the Air Force,
Hans Mark announced that the Boeing Aerospace Company (BAG)
had won the ALGM design fly-off. The reasons Secretary
Mark cited for the decision were that the BAG guidance system
was "somewhat better", the BAG aerodynamic qualities were
"a little better, and there were greater prospects for lower
costs and easier field maintenance with the BAG design" [1:1],
78

About two weeks later, JCMPO announced that the
Leader/Follower options would not be exercised. This
researcher questioned JCMPO personnel as to why neither of
the Leader/Follower options were exercised. The major
reason cited was the extent of subcontracting involved in the
BAG design. Although BAG was the prime integrator of the
design, approximately 80 percent of the components were sub-
contracted. During the Developmental Contract, BAG had
qualified or were qualifying dual source subcontractors.
Since dual source subcontractors had been developed, the
additional anticipated cost savings from second sourcing
the prime would not pay for required initial start-up costs
for the second prime. The objective to broaden the pro-
duction base was also judged to have been accomplished by
BAG subcontracting strategy.
Several interviewees felt that the decision not to
implement L/F was a political decision. They felt the BAG
had effectively "lobbied" the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees and the Appropriation Committees to ensure second
sourcing funding would not be forthcoming. In fact, both
Washington State Senators [BAG's corporate state] hold senior
influencial positions on these committees. However, top
JCMPO management did not confirm this allegation and felt the
decision was, in fact, a rational, logical decision. It is the
researcher's opinion that although the political implications were





F. THE DIGITAL SCENE MATCHING AREA CORRELATION SYSTEM SECOND
SOURCING STRATEGY
1. Second Sourcing Decision
The Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC)
System was recently developed by the Naval Avionics Center,
(NAC) Indianopolis, In. The purpose of DSMAC is to provide
greater accuracy than the current guidance system. This is
particularly important for the accuracy required for non-
nuclear cruise missiles. McDonnell Douglas Astronautics
Company (MDAC) has been "... contractually assigned guidance
responsibilities for [the] conventional tactical (non-nuclear)
land attack cruise missile".
. . .
[15:1]. The production of
DSMAC would be assigned to MDAC. However, in keeping with
their second sourcing policy, JCMPO decided that prior to
modifying the MDAC contract to produce DSMAC, they would require
MDAC to accept a Leader/Follower Second Sourcing Strategy.
2. Memorandum of Agreement
In June, 1980, a Memorandum of Agreement was
negotiated between JCMPO, MDAC and NAC which required
Leader/Follower implementation (see Appendix E) . In accordance
with the MOA, MDAC agreed to [17]
:
a. Prepare a RFP package for suitable contractors to
prepare offers as Followers on the DSMAC production and
competitively select the Follower with Government approval.
b. Qualify the second source within 16 months after
selection of a Follower.
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The MOA also spelled out remedies that the Government
may impose on MDAC if the second source is not qualified on
schedule through MDAC neglect. The following provision shall
apply if the second source fails to deliver or make progress
[17:6]:
1. MDAC shall supply additional DSMAC units to make up
the second source shortfall, within four months of their
scheduled delivery dates . . .
2. The government shall not be required to pay for
these additional MDAC supplied units until such time
as the second source is qualified ...
3. These units shall not increase the total buy from
MDAC, but shall only constitute a cost free loan of
units until such time as the second source is qualified.
4. At the sole discretion of JCMP, the right is reserved
to refuse to accept production units from the second
source until that source is qualified . . .
When this researcher asked why MDAC would accept such
terms, the interviewee stated that the Government not only
owned the data rights to DSMAC but actually possessed the
data and MDAC wants production rights to DSMAC. Even though
this acquisition is in the planning stages, JCMPO is confident
that this Leader/Follower Procurement will be a success with
close Government surveillance.
G. SUMMARY
In reviewing the four acquisitions, this researcher
observed that second sourcing could be analyzed in three
distinct phases: (1) the Second Sourcing Decision, (2) the
evaluation of Second Sourcing alternatives, and (3) Second
Sourcing implementation. The key criteria for determining
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if second sourcing was viable were: (1) the objectives of
cost savings and assurance of supply, and (2) the quantity of
units to be procured and the duration of the program.
In evaluating the various second sourcing alternatives
three major factors were considered: (1) the commonality
objective, (2) the ownership of technical data and, (3) the
time it would take to qualify a second source. In general,
commonality was a desired objective for all the acquisitions.
It was determined that, in each case, there was not enough
time to wait for a stabilized design package, therefore the
Technical Data Package Second Sourcing approach was not a
viable solution because the designer would be "too far down
the learning curve"to permit the Second Source to be a viable
competitor. This reduced the second sourcing alternatives
to Directed Licensing or Leader/Follower. The Government had
not acquired the technical data rights in two of the acqui-
sitions and in both cases the designers refused to consider
Leader/Follower or Directed Licensing. Then the Government
determined that commonality was not a driving objective and
proceeded with a Form, Fit, and Function approach. In both
cases, the designer then proposed a Directed Licensing or
modified Leader/Follower approach which was accepted by the
Government because the projected cost to design and operate




In order to achieve successful implementation the critical
factors appeared to be: (1) Follower selection, (2) Motivational
factors, and (3) the monitoring of L/F milestones.
The next Chapter of this thesis applies the Thompson-
Rubenstein Leader/Follower (T-R L/F) Model and evaluates
whether the Model accurately points out the key decision
points and implementation factors.
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VI. THE APPLICATION OF THE THOMPSON-RUBENSTEIN
LEADER/FOLLOWER MODEL TO THE JOINT CRUISE
MISSILE PROJECT OFFICE ACQUISITIONS
A. GENERAL
This Chapter discusses the application of Thompson-
Rubenstein Leader/Follower (T-R L/F) Model to the JCMPO
acquisitions described in Chapter V of this thesis. The
next section of this Chapter is organized to match the decis-
ion steps of the T-R L/F Model. The steps are: (1) the
Preliminary analysis, (2) Detailed Analysis, and (3) How to
Use Leader/Follower. The strong points and deficiencies of
the Model will be pointed out as each variable is discussed
in the decision-making process. Throughout this Chapter the
researcher will refer to the T-R L/R Model and the final
report. The distinction being made is that the final report,
which contains the Model, discusses other factors which are
not directly referred to in the Model. Section C summarizes
the researcher findings discussed in Section B of this Chapter,
B. THE APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
1. Preliminary Analysis
a. The Objectives of Second Sourcing
The first step in the Model requires that the
Program Manager formulate his/her second sourcing objectives.
In all of the JCMPO acquisitions the primary objectives were
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cost containment/savings and assurance of supply. The Model
states these are appropriate objectives for second sourcing
using the Leader/Follower technique. These objectives were
also supported by "strong policy guidance" [34:14]. This
policy was issued by the JCMPO and EXCOM; and was in theory,
supported by the Legislative Branch.
Although not a primary objective, an anticipated
benefit of second sourcing for the JCMPO was increased
"contractor responsiveness" to program goals and redirection;
thereby, making program management an easier task. This
phenomenon can be supported by the Williams Research Corpora-
tion (WRC) and Litton Systems, Inc. agreement to license their
designs when threatened with alternate design development.
JCMPO personnel also pointed out that General Dynamic s/Convair
(GD/C) was "very responsive" to ALCM redirection during the
fly-off competition, however the SLCM and GLCM project personnel
found GD/C to be less than cooperative and responsive to their
needs because GD/C had already won the design competition for
these projects. The Thompson-Rubenstein final report implied
that dual contract management would present additional problems
[34 :B]; however, JCMPO experience shows that competition made
project management an easier task.
b. The Characteristics of the Procurement
In determining the feasibility of second sourcing,
the Model requires that the size of the procurement, and the
stability of the program be examined. The JCMPO, having been
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designated a high priority strategic program, meet the
Model's criteria for second sourcing because it is not
likely that this program will be cancelled and because the
quantities required are sufficient to anticipate cost savings
from the introduction of effective competition.
Another characteristic, technical complexity,
is discussed in an appendix of the final report. Cruise
Missile technology was judged to be not so complex nor so
common that the possibility of second sourcing using Leader/
Follower was ruled out. JCMPO experiences have shown this to
be true.
'5?he divisibility of the program (which this
researcher defines to mean the "extent of subcontracting")
,
is discussed in the final report but not in the Model. The
extent of subcontracting was the deciding factor in the ALCM
and the Guidance Set second sourcing decisions. In both cases,
the extent of subcontracting proved to be the reason why L/F
was not implemented. However, JCMPO required that the "prime"
develop second source subcontractors for critical, high cost
components and subcomponents. Due to the fact that two major
L/F decisions were based on this factor, it is a finding of
this researcher that this factor should be directly addressed
in the Model.
c. Time or Timing
The T-R L/F Model stresses the timing factor in
terms of the "time needed" to qualify a second source. In all
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of the JCMPO procurements this factor was considered, and
schedules were formed so that the second source could be a
viable competitor for out-year production contracts. This
was the major consideration in determining that the Technical
Data Package second sourcing approach would not be appropriate
for JCMPO acquisitions if the second source was to be a viable
"competitor" for out-year production contracts.
d. Commonality
If, after reviewing the above cited factors, \
second sourcing appears viable, then the T-R L/F Model examines
the possibility of using the L/F technique. The first factor
discussed is commonality. In all of the JCMPO procurements,
commonality was a desired objective. However, only in the
ALCM second sourcing strategy was this a driving objective
due to the high cost of producing and maintaining two designs.
Form, Fit, and Function was a viable alternative to L/F in the
remaining acquisitions; however, it was determined that it was
more cost advantageous to support only one design.
e. Reprocurement Data Base
The Model discusses this factor in terms of
"availability" and "completeness." In all of the JCMPO
acquisitions a complete data package was not available to
the Government for a TDP second sourcing strategy; nor would
it be available in "time" to qualify a second source to be
an effective "competitor." Therefore, L/F or DL are the only
alternatives available if commonality is a desired objective.
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The final report briefly discusses technical
data rights; however, it is a finding of this researcher
that ownership of technical data rights is a major factor
in a Leader/Follower second sourcing decision. In the engine
acquisition, the decision to second source was made after WRC
had basically completed the design of the engine. WRC claimed
proprietary data rights and therefore would only consider a
licensing arrangement. Subsequent investigation has shown
that WRC did not have the rights claimed but JCMPO did not
have the "time" to investigate these claims prior to starting
the education of the second source if he was to be a viable
competitor for out-year production contracts. Therefore, a
licensing agreement was arranged, JCMPO personnel felt that
if the L/F second sourcing decision had been made in the
development phase, technical data rights probably would not
have been a major concern to the second sourcing strategy.
In the ALCM second sourcing strategy, the rights
to the technical data was not a concern because part of the
selection criteria was the "winner's" agreement to accept the
Leader/Follower options as stated in the RFP.
The question of data rights did not surface in
the DSMAC acquisition because not only did the Government
own the data but actually possessed the data. However, the
Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and McDonnell
Douglas Astronautics Corporation (MDAC) carefully spells out
the Government's rights to the data [17:8],
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The technical data rights presented a problem in
the RMUC/INE acquisition. The decision to second source was
made in the development phase and it was the Government '
s
intention to acquire unlimited rights to the data. However,
Litton 's Guidance Control Systems Division (GCSD) claimed
technical data rights to portions of their design proposal.
The Government did not question these claims as they did the
WRC claim. However, Litton would accept a Leader/Follower
arrangement by licensing another Litton Systems division to
produce RMUC/INE. Under this arrangement, the Government
would not be charged a licensing fee.
In light of the JCMPO experiences, the Government's
ownership of technical data appears to be essential to a
Leader/Follower decision and that early second sourcing plan-
ning will facilitate the acquisition of these rights. There-
fore, this researcher would suggest that the T-R L/F Model
does not adequately address the "technical data" variable and
its relationship to time for reasons cited above.
f. Characteristics of the Industry and (Potential)
Contractors
The Model states that the willingness and ability
of the Leader and Follower is a factor to be considered in the
L/F decision. However, it does not discuss means of "motivat-
ing a contractor" to be "willing" to accept a L/F arrangement.
In fact, the final report states that the contractor saw this
technique as just "another cost of doing business" [34:B-11].
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This was not the experience of the JCMPO. In each case, the
potential "leader" saw L/F as means to reduce their business
base and potential profits. In the engine and RMUC/INE
acquisitions, the JCMPO had to threaten development of an
alternate design which would further reduce their chances
for business before they would consider licensing their
designs.
In the ALCM acquisition, the Boeing Aerospace
Company (BAC) and General Dynamics/Convair (GD/C) accepted
the L/F options only because it was part of the source
selection criteria. BAC indicated that a Follower was not
necessary provided they were the "winners", however, if GD/C
won the competition, BAC wanted to be the Follower. GD/C
appeared to be even less interested in the L/F options be-
cause they felt they would not be the Follower if BAC "won"
the competition and didn't need a Follower if they won.
In the DSMAC acquisition, McDonnel Douglas agreed
to the L/F second sourcing strategy because they wanted pro-
duction rights to DSMAC.
In light of JCMPO experiences, this researcher
observes that a Program Manager should consider means to
motivate a "potential Leader" to accept the L/F second
sourcing strategy and that the "timing" of the L/F decision
will determine its importance in L/F planning. If L/F is
part of the selection criteria, then the "potential Leader"
will most likely accept L/F as was the case with ALCM and
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DSMAC. If, however, the selection of the producer is made
before the second sourcing decision, then the threat of
loss of future business may prove effective, as JCMPO intends
to do with WRC and the future MRASM engines. The threat to
develop an alternate design may also be effective as it was
with Litton in the RMUC/INE acquisition.
Another factor which the T-R L/F Model should have
addressed was the (potential) contractors' concern that
sufficient quantities of a unit will be procured to warrant
capital investment of two contractors in the project. This
was a major negotiation point for both Litton in the RMUC/INE
agreement and McDonnell Douglas in the DSMAC agreement. In
both cases the Government (JCMPO) agreed to reimburse the
contractor for the unamortized portion of their investments
if the Government cancelled the projects before specified
quantities were acquired. This agreement was not a problem
for JCMPO because this project is a strategic prograjn and
strongly supported by DOD and Congress. However, this may
create problems for another Program Manager attempting to
utilize the L/F technique because he/she may not have the
authorization to obligate the Government in this manner.
2. Detailed Analysis
The detailed analysis required by the Model examines
the "cost" and the "availability" objectives if second sourc-
ing using L/F is considered feasible. Drawing from JCMPO
experience, a detailed cost, schedule (availability) and risk
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analysis was conducted in each case to determine the
feasibility of using L/F or other second sourcing techniques.
The most common alternative to L/F was Form, Fit, and Function.
In all cases, L/F or DL was considered the more cost effective
and risk averse method of second sourcing for the JCMPO " ; i'
acquisition.
If Preliminary and Detailed analyses show that Leader/
Follower is a viable second sourcing technique then the user
of the Model moves into the next phase. How to Use Leader/
Follower.
3. How to Use Leader/Follower
a. Form
The Model suggests the three contractual relation-
ships described in DAR [20:4-701]. However, it does not com-
ment on which method is most advantageous to successful Leader/
Follower implementation. The JCMPO has either planned to use
or used the first suggested relationship, requiring the
"Leader" to subcontract with the "Follower." The driving
reasons for selecting this contractual relationship was the
belief held by JCMPO that this method would maximize common-
ality and minimize Government involvement in the technology
transfer. This method shifts the responsibility for "complete-
ness" and "accuracy" of specifications to the Leader rather
than the Government. Since JCMPO did not use the other two
procedures, this researcher cannot comment from an experience
point of view. However, interviewees felt that the other
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methods were more appropriate for the shipbuilding industry
where "cooperation" rather than "competition" is the driving
consideration because these methods would appear to "lessen"
the Leader's perception that the Follower is taking his
business. In addition, in shipbuilding, the Government takes
a much more "active" role in the system's design and is,
therefore, in a better position to give assistance to the
Follower.
b. Incentives
The second factor discussed in the Model is the
use of incentives to ensure successful Leader/Follower imple-
mentation. One incentive cited by the Model is tying progress
payments to L/F milestones. The importance of incentives,
especially "negative" incentives, can best be appreciated by
analyzing the Memoranda of Agreement (see Appendices C through
E) negotiated by the JCMPO as they gained experience in
technology transfer. The agreement in the JCMPO 's first
attempt at technology transfer, the engine procurement, did
not contain any negative incentives and technology transfer
has not been a success. In the RMUC/INE procurement, the
threat of terminating the agreement if the two Litton
Divisions did not tranfer the technology on schedule appeared
to be sufficient in this case because the profits of both
divisions stayed in the same corportation. In this acquisition,
technology transfer was successfully completed. Recently,
JCMPO and McDonnell Douglas (MDAC) signed an agreement which
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contained very stringent negative incentives if MDAC fails
to select a competent Follower and qualify him per the
technology transfer schedule.
Positive incentives were also stated in the Memo-
randa of Agreement. Some of the positive motivating factors
considered or used by JCMPO in the various acquisitions were:
(a) structuring an award fee around the accomplishment of L/F
milestones, (b) basing the Leader's split for the first competi-
tive contract on his performance during the technology transfer
phase, and (c) guaranteeing the Leader a specific percentage of
the yearly production quantity which may or may not be above
the minimum sustaining rate.
The selection of a Follower is not addressed by
the Model. The final report does address the importance of
selecting a technically qualified Follower, however, it does
not address possible problems the Program Manager may encounter
if the "Leader" rather than the Government competitively
selects the Follower. WRC wanted to select a totally unquali-
fied engine licensee. Government personnel felt that their
"hands-on" involvement in the Teledyne (TCAE) selection avoided
even more problems with the engine acquisition. If they had
not conducted their own on-site surveys of the prospective
licensees then Williams might have successfully selected, with




Another implementation factor, the Government's
relationship with the Leader and Follower, was not addressed
in the Model. JCMPO personnel feel that part of the success
of the RMUC/INE second sourcing can be attributed to the
appointment of a single contact point in the project office
for the companies to contact if they experienced problems in
the technology transfer phase. This was not done for the
engine technology transfer phase and Teledyne did not take
the initiative and contact JCMPO when L/F problems surfaced.
After these two experiences, JCMPO intends to take an active
and aggressive role in any future Leader/Follower acquisitions.
The final factor the Model addresses under L/F
implementation is contract monitoring. The Model suggests
in-process reviews to monitor L/F performance, however, it
does not stress its importance to L/F implementation. Again,
the engine acquisition points out its importance. DCAS is
not organized to monitor the technology transfer aspect of
the contracts and JCMPO personnel had not anticipated this
problem as they felt that Teledyne would surface any imple-
mentation problems. In the future, joint program reviews will
closely monitor the engine L/F milestones and the cost
performance reports required by C/SCSC.
C . SUMMARY
1. Conclusions
From the above analysis, it is the finding of this
researcher that the Thompson-Rubenstein Leader/Follower
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(T-R L/F) Model does not adequately address the competitive
nature of the Aerospace Industry. The underlying assumption
of the Model appears to be that the Leader will cooperate
with Leader/Follower implementation with little or no pressure
from the Government. This assumption may hold true for the
shipbuilding industry, but is inappropriate for the Aerospace
industry.
The following specific conclusions can be drawn from
the application of the T-R L/F Model to the JCMPO acquisitions.
a. The Model effectively defined the variables to
consider when making a cost savings second sourcing analysis.
b. The reasons for early second sourcing planning
were not adequately addressed by the Model.
c. The Model does not adequately address the acqui-
sition of technical data rights.
d. The "How to Use" section is inadequate for proper
L/F implementation planning.
2. Recommendation
In light of the deficiencies of the Thompson-Rubenstein
Leader/Follower (T-R L/F) Model, especially in its "How to Use"
section, this researcher recommends that the T-R L/F Model be
modified to reflect the competitive nature of the Aerospace
Industry as supported by experiences of the Joint Cruise
Missile Project Office. The next Chapter of this thesis






VII. PROPOSED LEADER/FOLLOWER MODEL
A. GENERAL
The purpose of this Chapter is to present a Leader/Follower
Model that reflects the competitive nature of the Aerospace
Industry as supported by the experiences of the Joint Curise
Missile Project Office. Since this Model is based on Aero-
space Industry experiences, it will probably be more useful
to a program manager working in this environment.
The Model is a simulation model and attempts to present
a framework for determining if second sourcing is feasible
and if the Leader/Follower technique is a viable approach to
second sourcing. The Model is divided into three major
sections: (1) The Second Sourcing Analysis/Decision, (2) The
Leader/Follower Decision, and (3) Leader/Follower Implemen-
tation. In each section, the Model attempts to identify
critical factors and where L/F does not appear to be a viable
technique, it suggests alternate second sourcing techniques.
Many factors in the Model are closely interrelated, however,
the Model attempts to logically consider each variable as a
Program Manager might in determining if L/F is applicable to
his/her program. This Model will be most effective if the
program manager is considering the L/F second sourcing technique
in the developmental phase of the program; however, it does
attempt to consider options that a program manager might consider
if the system is in the production phase.
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B. SECOND SOURCING ANALYSIS/DECISION
1. Objectives
If the primary objectives for establishing a second
source are: (a) cost savings, (b) assuring a source of supply,
(c) meeting delivery requirements which cannot be achieved by
one supplier, and (d) maintaining the mobilization base, then
there are several second sourcing techniques a program man-
ager may consider such as: (a) Technical Data Package (TDP)
,
(b) Form, Fit, and Function, (c) Directed Licensing (DL)
,
and (d) Leader/Follower (L/F) . If an additional program
objective is standardization (commonality) of the system,
subsystem or component, then Form, Fit, and Function would
not be an appropriate second sourcing technique.
2. Cost Savings Analysis
The basic purpose of this analysis is to determine if
cost savings can be anticipated if competition is maintained
through production. This analysis would be critical to the
second sourcing decision if cost savings was the primary
objective for second sourcing. However, if assurance of
supply or the maintenance of the mobilization base is the
driving objective, then this analysis will not be as critical
to the second sourcing decision.
98

Most cost analyses are based on learning curve
projections. When the Program Manager reviews the analysis
he should carefully consider several variable that such an
analysis usually assumes such as program stability, duration,
the minimum sustaining rate, the learning curve projection,
and the time it will take to qualify the second source.
a. Program Stability
The quantities used and program duration assumed
by the analysis are heavily dependent on the stability of the
program. If the program has DOD and Legislative support and
planned acquisition quantities are large enough, then projected
cost savings may be justifiably anticipated. However, if there
is a possibility that the program will be cancelled or the
quantities reduced, then the second source initial start-up
costs will not be paid for by out-year acquisitions.
b. The Minimum Sustaining Rate
An underlying assumption of second sourcing is that
two sources will be maintained. Therefore, the cost analysis
should consider a quantity split such that both sources are
sustained. Early planning will facilitate the amount and
type of tooling procured by the developer and the second
source. If the second sourcing decision is made during pro-
duction, the developer may have already procured tooling
sufficient to produce the total yearly quantities and, by
second sourcing, the developer's production capacity may be
under-utilized and therefore, not cost effective.
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c. Learning Curve Projection
Anticipated learning curves for sole source and
competitive procurement of the system are compared. These
estimates are usually based on industry experience; however,
the program manager should carefully analyze these estimates,
especially if the projected cost savings are relatively small.
d. Qualify the Second Source
The analysis should also consider how long it will
take to qualify the second source to produce the Leader's
design. If there are sufficient quantity requirements to
justify waiting until the system design is stabilized and the
Government owns the technical data package, the TDP may be
the appropriate second sourcing technique. However, the
faster the second source is qualified, the sooner the cost
savings will be realized. Both DL and L/F are designed to
qualify a second source prior to the Government's proofing of
the design package. In addition, TDP may be ruled out because
there isn't sufficient time to wait for design proofing if the
second source is to be a viable competitor for out-year
production contracts.
3. Industry Interest
Closely related to industry interest in a specific
program is the industry's perception of the program's stability,
A firm will not, most likely, be interested in investing its
resources in a program that appears to be lacking either DOD
or Congressional support because the return on its investment
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will not be of an "acceptable" level since the program could
be cancelled prior to or during production. Therefore a
guarantee to reimburse a firm for its capital investment,
if the program is terminated or severely cut back, may be
required of the Government before a firm will consider
participating in a Second Sourcing Strategy.
C. THE LEADER/FOLLOWER DECISION
1. General
If the Second Sourcing Analysis indicates that second
sourcing is desireable and that Leader/Follower may be a
viable second sourcing technique, then the porgram manager
should consider several additional factors before making a
L/F decision including technical data rights, technical
complexity, reprocurement data package, motivational factors,
political consideration, and the extent of subcontracting.
2. Technical Data Rights
If L/F is to be a viable alternative for second
sourcing, then the Government must acquire ownership of the
technical data rights. These rights will be more easily
acquired if the decision to second source using L/F is made in
the early stages of the program and the developmental contract
includes the clause to acquire unlimited data rights. If the
decision to second source is made at the completion of the
system's development, then it is more likely that the developer
will claim proprietary data rights which he will refuse to
transfer to the Follower. If investigation proves the validity
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of this claim or the program lacks the necessary time to
investigate these claims prior to second sourcing implemen-
tation, then L/F may not be a feasible second sourcing
methodology. The program manager might, at this point, explore
the possibility of using DL, or Form, Fit, and Function if
commonality is not a driving objective.
3. Technical Complexity
The purpose of L/F is to provide a method of trans-
ferring highly complex technology to the second source and
this transfer would only be successful if the designer (Leader)
assisted the Follower. The use of L/F would be inappropriate





Closely tied to this variable is Technical Complexity.
If there is available a complete and accurate reprocurement
data package and designer technical assistance is not
necessary, then the more traditional second sourcing tech-
nique, TDP, should be considered. The importance of this
factor will depend on the timing of the second sourcing
decision. If the program is in production, then the
possibility of a complete data package is more likely, making




One very distinct drawback to L/F is the natural
reluctance of the Leader to educate a competitor. The program
manager contemplating the use of L/F should plan to motivate
the Leader to accept L/F. The necessity of motivating the
Leader is closely tied to the timing of the L/F decision. If
the decision to second source is made in the developmental
phases of the program, then the program manager can capitalize
on the design competition by making a priced out Leader/
Follower option part of the source selection criteria. This
may also alleviate any problems over technical data rights.
The decision to implement L/F is not always made,
however, before design selection. If this is the case, claims
of proprietary data will most likely impede L/F implementation,
A possible tact that a program manager may consider is the
development of an alternate design, (Form, Fit, and Design) , if
development costs are not prohibitive and commonality is not a
driving objective. This threat may induce the developer to
counter this acquisition strategy with a DL arrangement.
Another avenue the program manager may try is guaranteeing
a specific percentage of the yearly production buy. However
this tact may reduce the competitive potential of L/F if the





Congress, as a whole, approves and encourages the
use of competition in Government contracting; however, con-
stituency interest may override this philosophy for an
individual Congressman. The Program Manager should consider
the "Leader's" influence on his Congressmen and the importance
of the L/F decision. It is possible that a few Congressmen
have enough influence to cause the withholding of required
second sourcing funding. It may be that a program manager
may have to compromise an individual decision in order to
accomplish a more important program goal.
7. The Extent of Subcontracting
If a major portion of the system is subcontracted,
then requiring the designer to establish dual subcontracting
sources may be the most cost effective way to achieve the
intended L/F objectives. The critical decision criteria
would be that additonal projected cost savings substantially
exceed the cost of implementing L/F. This factor should be
closely examined when considering second sourcing an entire
system or major subsystem.
D. LEADER/FOLLOWER IMPLEMENTATION
1. Procedures




a. The Leader subcontracts with a Follower and
provides technical assistance and know-how to the Follower.
b. The Government contracts directly with the
Leader and Follower. The Leader's contract requires that
he provide assistance to the Follower.
c. The Government contracts directly with the
Leader and Follower. The Follower's contract requires that
he subcontract with the Leader for assistance.
The actual procedure the program manager selects
appears to depend on two factors: (1) the second sourcing
objectives, and (2) the Government's involvement in the design
of the system. Procedures "b" and "c" appear to reduce the
Follower's dependency on the Leader; and, therefore, the
competitive environment would be minimized. Procedures "b"
and "c", also, appear to be more appropriate if the Government
is actively involved in the design of the system and the
Leader does not have "more" knowledge than the Government.
Procedure "a", however, appears to be more appropriate if
the Leader has in-depth knowledge and Government assistance
would be insufficient if the Leader and Follower were not
working closely with each other.
2. Technology Transfer Planning
The first step to successful L/F implementation
appears to be the establishment of a definitive Technology
Transfer Plan (TTP) . The Plan should specify specific dates
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for milestone accomplishment and the date that the Leader
will qualify the Follower as a capable producer of the
system.
The TTP should also address configuration management.
In order to facilitate communication, both the Leader and the
Follower would be part of the configuration management board;
however, the Leader is usually assigned configuration control
responsibility. Specific turn-around times for configuration
changes should be specified to avoid the Leader holding out
on the Follower.
The TTP should also address testing requirements that
the Leader will perform for the Follower, if any. As with
the configuration management, the plan should specify turn-
around times.
3. Motivational Considerations
The importance of this factor cannot be overstated.
A contract may state that technology transfer will happen;
however, the longer a Leader takes to qualify a Follower the
better his competitive position because he continues down the
learning curve while the Follower falls behind. Therefore
a program manager should consider using both positive and
negative incentives especially the latter, to ensure technology
transfer occurs on schedule.
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Possible positive incentives are:
a. Establishing an award fee arrangement which
provides incentives for the Leader's management of the
Follower.
b. Base the Leader's portion of the first year's
fully competitive buy on his performance during the technology
transfer phase.
Possible negative motivational factors are:
a. Tying progress payments to L/F milestones.
b. Requiring the Leader to meet the Follower's
delivery schedule. However, the Leader would not be paid
for these units until the Follower delivers.
c. Publicize a low award fee.
In order to ensure that all parties understand their
duties and responsibilities, a Memorandum of Agreement should
be prepared which spells out schedule requirements and the
motivational factors. This document would be signed by the
Government, the Leader and the Follower, if selected prior
to contract award.
4. Follower Selection
The selection of the Follower may be accomplished
by (1) Government selection or (2) requiring the Leader to
competitively select the Follower. The criteria for selecting
a Follower would be the same criteria used to select the
Leader with the exception of subcontracting experience.
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The Follower should be capable of working from another
company's drawings and extensive subcontracting experience
would indicate this ability exists.
If the Leader selects the Follower, the Government
should reserve the right to approve the selection of the
Follower. The Government should be actively involved in
this selection process and not just a "reviewer" of the
selection criteria because, if competition is the ultimate
goal, the Leader will, most likely, select a Follower who is
either technically "weak" or sees himself as a subcontractor
to the Leader. In either case, the technology transfer would
be slowed down and the Leader's competitive position will be
enhanced because he "will continue down the learning curve"
as the Follower falls behind. If the Follower is technically
weak it will take longer to "educate" him. On the other
hand, if the Follower sees himself as a subcontractor, then he
will wait for the Leader's direction which will most likely
be slow in coming, thus "stretching out" the Technology
Transfer.
The decision as to whether the Government or the
Leader selects the Follower may be dependent on three factors:
(1) the Government's contractual relationship with the Leader,
(2) the resources of the project office, and (3) Leader/Follower
compatibility. If the potential Leader is a subcontractor to
a Government prime contractor, then the prime is contractually
obligated to select or oversee the selection of the Follower.
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However, the Government does retain the right to approve all
subcontracts [20:7-700]. On the other hand, the Government
may direct the prime to contract with a specified subcontractor
as part of its contractual obligations but the Government
hesitates to use this option because of the other two factors.
It takes considerable resources on the part of the
Government's project office to draft the Request for Pro-
posals and selection criteria. The program office may not
have the personnel to prepare these documents in a timely
manner. Therefore, the project office may opt to have the
Leader select the Follower in order to conserve its resources.
If this is the case, the Government assumes a "reviewer's"
role of the Leader's RFP and selection criteria. However,
the Government does risk the possibility that this "reviewing"
will not adequately ensure that the Leader's RFP and selection
criteria are detailed enough to permit the potential Followers
to "intelligently" submit technical and cost proposals.
The third factor, compatibility, may encourage an
agreement between the Leader and Follower that neither will
take over the program by "low-balling" the future competitive
contracts. The program office may avoid this by guaranteeing
a minimum sustaining rate to both. On the other hand, the
Government should reserve the right to select one contractor




"Low-balling" is a possibility regardless of who
selects the Follower and ensuring realistic pricing is the
best way to avoid its use.
5. Government's Relationship with Leader and Follower
For successful L/F implementation, it appears that
the project office should take an active and aggressive
monitoring role. DCAS organizations are neither funded nor
organized to monitor this aspect of the contract, therefore,
the program manager should appoint a single contact in the
project office for L/F monitoring. This individual should
contact both the Leader and Follower and explain that he is
the expediter for L/F implementation and instill into the
Follower that the Government is the customer, not the Leader.
6. Feedback Considerations
Closely related to the success of the L/F implemen-
tation is the establishment of feedback systems. The use of
cost performance reports required by C/SCSC is one way to
monitor L/F performance. However, these reports are only
useful if the progress reported is, in fact, accomplished.
In relation to C/SCSC the contract type selected for the
technology transfer phase should allow the use of this
reporting criteria.
Another monitoring device could be the requirement
that L/F progress be reported at joint program reviews. This
would emphasize the importance of this aspect of the contract
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and the program managers for the Government, the Leader and
the Follower could discuss implementation problems and the
menas to corect them. It would, also, provide positive
feedback if L/F implementation was on schedule.
E. USE OF THE MODEL
There has been no attempt to graphically depict this
Model because this will tend to prioritize the variables
discussed. The characteristics of a particular program and
the timing of the L/F decision will dictate the importance
of the variables. The prioritization of the variables will
be part of the "tailoring" process; however, the Model does
attempt to identify critical decision variables depending
on the timing of the second sourcing planning.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
As a result of this study, the following conclusions are
presented
:
Conclusion #1. The Thompson-Rubenstein Leader/Follower
(T-R L/F) Model does not reflect the competitive nature of
the Aerospace Industry.
The \inderlying assumption of the T-R L/F Model appears to
be that the Leader will cooperate with the Leader-Follower
acquisition strategy. This is best illustrated by the state-
ment in the Thompson-Rubenstein final report that L/F is
"another cost of doing business." However, in each of the
Joint Cruise Missile Project Office (JCMPO) acquisitions, the
Government had to use some "threat" to get the Leader to
accept the strategy. The Aerospace Industry is very competitive
and, in the past, once a design was selected for production,
the designer had seen himself as the sole source producer.
Therefore, a Program Manager considering the use of Leader/
Follower should plan to "motivate" the designer to accept the
use of the L/F acquisition strategy.
Conclusion #2. The Thompson-Rubenstein Leader/Follower
(T-R L/F) Model appears to more accurately reflect the Ship-
building Industry use of Leader/Follower.
In the Shipbuilding Industry, L/F is used to maintain the
industry business base and encourage commonality. Usually,
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both the Leader and Follower are prime contractors to the
Government which lessens the preception that the Follower
is taking business from the Leader. Therefore, the contractors
are more cooperative in accepting and implementing L/F
because it is recognized neither contractor has the opportunity
to receive the total contract award. In the Aerospace Industry,
the possibility exists that the Government may award the total
quantity or the majority of the quantity to a single contractor;
thus, maintaining the competitive environment. The Model
depicts a "cooperative attitude," not a competitive attitude,
especially in the Model's implementation planning.
Conclusion #3. The Thompson-Rubenstein Leader/Follower
(T-R L/F) Model does accurately reflect the variables that
a Program should consider in evaluating the cost analysis.
An analysis of various cost projection models substantiate
the importance of the T-R L/F Model's cost related variables.
By using the T-R L/F Model, a Program Manager will consider
the various assumptions built into a cost analysis, and
therefore, more accurately evaluate its relevance to his/her
program.
Conclusion #4. The Thompson-Rubenstein Leader/Follower
(T-R L/F) Model does not address the importance of planning
for the acquisition of technical data rights when considering
the use of Leader/Follower strategy.
The use of Leader/Follower was not possible in the engine
acquisition because the Government failed to establish clear
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ownership of the rights. JCMPO personnel felt L/F would have
been a viable second sourcing method if they had acquired the
technical data rights while in the development phase. There-
fore, this variable should be included in the Model as a
critical decision variable.
Conclusion #5. The Thompson-Rubenstein Leader/Follower
(T-R L/F) Model does not identify the "Extent of Subcontract-
ing" as a critical decision variable in the Leader/Follower
decision-making process .
The decision not to implement L/F in the ALCM and the
Guidance Sets acquisitions was based on the extent of sub-
contracting utilized by the designers (potential Leaders)
.
It was determined that the establishment of competitive
subcontractors was the most cost effective method to achieve
L/F objectives of cost savings and assurance of supply.
Therefore, this factor should have been addressed in the Model.
Conclusion #6. The Thompson-Rubenstein Leader/Follower
(T-R L/F) Model is inadequate for L/F implementation planning
because it does not address; (1) Follower selection, (2)
negative motivational factors, and (3) monitoring procedures.
Again the Model appears to assume cooperation in implement-
ing L/F. However, based on JCMPO experiences. Aerospace firms
will attempt to impede L/F implementation by selecting a "weak"
Follower and/or not adhering to the technology transfer schedule
in order to put the Follower at a competitive disadvantage.
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The Model should have reflected this attitude and recommended
proper selection and monitoring procedures to ensure successful
L/F implementation.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this research, the following recommendations
are offered:
Recommendation #1. The Government should, in all cases, either
select the Follower or approve the Follower selected by the
Leader
.
A proposed change to Leader/Follower procedures in the
Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) omits the requirement
that the Government approve the Leader's selected Follower.
JCMPO experiences demonstrates that the Leader will attempt
to select a "weak" Follower. Therefore, the DAR Working
Committee should re-instate this requirement in its proposed
change
Recommendation #2. A Program Manager, attempting to use
Leader/Follower (L/F) should appoint an individual in the
Project Office to monitor Leader/Follower implementation.
A single manager, as illustrated in the Engine and RMUC/INE
acquisitions, is necessary for successful Leader/Follower
implementation. The DCAS organization is not funded to provide
a single manager if the Leader and Follower are located in
different regions. Therefore, a Program Manager should not
rely on DCAS to monitor the L/F aspect of the contract.
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Recommendation #3. A Program Manager should establish firm
negative motivational factors^ such as tying progress pay-
ments to L/F milestones y to ensure the Leader maintains the
technology transfer schedule.
An analysis of the various JCMPO Memoranda of Agreement
underscores the importance of this aspect. As the Project
Office became more experienced in technology transfer, nega-
tive motivational factors were included in the Agreements.
This was necessary to ensure that the technology transfer
schedule was maintained. Therefore, when drafting and
negotiating the Technology Transfer Agreement, the Project
Manager should include negative, as well as positive,
motivational factors.
Recommendation #4. The Model developed as a result of this
study should be used by Program Managers considering or
attempting to use the Leader/Follower methodology as a
second sourcing strategy.
As this Model is based on Aerospace experience, it will
probably be more useful to a Program Manager dealing with
Aerospace firms. These Program Managers should be directed
to evaluate the applicability and usefulness of the Model
and to provide feedback to the Acquisition Research Community,
(e.g. the Center for Acquisition Research (NCAR) ) , in the
form of modifications or additions which will improve the
usefulness of the Model.
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C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the significant aspects of applying the Thompson-
Rubenstein Leader/Follower Model? The fact that this Model
more accurately reflects the Shipbuilding Industry, a Program
Manager, dealing with Aerospace Firms, would be required to
significantly "tailor" this Model before attempting to use it
in his/her Aerospace program. The researcher proposes a Model
in Chapter VII for use which more accurately reflects the
Aerospace Industry characteristics as discussed in Chapter II
of this thesis.
2. What is the Leader/Follower concept and what are the
critical factors attendent to its use? Chapter II and III of
this thesis address this question. Basically L/F is a second
sourcing strategy which requires the designer to educate a
second source so that he will become a qualified producer of
the designer's system. In attempting to use L/F, the Program
Manager should plan to acquire technical data rights and to
closely monitor L/F implementation.
3. What are the major features of the Thompson-
Rubenstein Leader/Follower (T-R L/F) Model? Chapter IV
discusses the salient characteristics of the T-R L/F Model.
The Model addresses L/F in three stages: (1) the Preliminary
Analysis, (2) the Detailed Analysis, and (3) the "How to Use"
section. The Model stresses the necessity of having a stable
program before attempting L/F implementation. This is
important, if cost savings is the primary objective, because
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the cost to establish a Follower may not be recovered by
projected savings if the Program is cancelled.
4. What are the major features of the Joint Cruise
Missile Project (JCMP) that lend themselves to use of the
Leader/Follower acquisition strategy? The Joint Cruise
Missile Project is a well established strategic program and
therefore supported by DOD and Congress. The project will
acquire sufficient units to anticipate cost savings by
introducing a second source and is sufficiently funded to
establish a second source. Chapter V of this thesis reviews
current JCMPO policy and acquisiton planning.
5. What are the critical aspects of tailoring the
Thompson-Rubenstein Model for application to the Joint Cruise
Missile Project (JCMP)
?
The Model must be "tailored" by
introducing the concept of motivating the Leader to accept a
L/F strategy. The How to Use Section must, also be modified
to reflect the importance of planning to ensure that the
Leader is motivated to: (1) select an appropriate Follower
and (2) implement L/F per the technology transfer schedule.
Chapter VI presents an in-depth analysis of the application
of the T-R L/F Model to the JCMPO acquisitions.
D. FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research should be conducted to determine if
innovative methods of contracting, such as Fixed Price/Award
Fee arrangement, would facilitate the use of Leader/Follower.
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Another contracting arrangement that a researcher may con-
sider is a Fixed Price arrangement for the Leader with a































This appendix presents the Leader/Follower Decision
Model developed by Charles W.N. Thompson and Albert H.
Rubenstein for the Air Force Business Research Management
Center, The Decision Model is part of the final report for
contract no. F33615-79-C-5073. The final report discusses
in detail the factors of the model. Chapter IV of this
thesis attempts to summarize the salient characteristics




The decision model to be presented here is, in the
words of the statement-of-work, to be used "... for apply-
ing the leader/follower concept to programs that involve
acquisition of complex products and systems", and by
"acquisition and contracting managers...". While a decision
model could vary from the descriptive generalities of the
present DAR provisions to an endlessly detailed branching
algorithm, it appears that the most generally useful level
of presentation would be in the form of a process description
which identifies the factors associated with two decisions:
a) whether or not to use (or consider using) leader/follower;
and b) how to use it. The level of supporting detail is
a more difficult question because many, if not all, of the
factors, and the process for evaluating them, are common
to other decisions in the acquisition process, and thus
within the present competence of acquisition and contract-
ing managers. In the presentation here, detail will be
provided to highlight the specific processes used in
leader/follower, with some risk of cluttering up the
process with the obvious, on the one hand, or oversimpli-
fication on the other.
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The model is, basically, a sequential decision (flow) model,
presenting the initial decision of "whether or not to use"
in a series of steps keyed to critical factors, followed
by the second decision of "how to use it" in outline form.
B. Overview of the Model
As is true with many, if not all, complex decision
processes, the sequence of specific, detailed decisions
many vary according to the individual decision maker and
the specific circumstances, and may be iterative. For
convenience in presentation, the model proposes a sequence
which may represent a preferred practice but, in any event,
provides a check list and a frame of reference.
The Overall Decision Model appears in graphical form in
Figure 1 . Each of the major decision steps is described in
one or more paragraphs in this section, as follows:
Whether to Use
Preliminary Analysis
Second Source Decision Paragraph C










The notation in the boxes for the major steps is in three
forms. First, in the boxes under "Preliminary Analysis",
the references are all (except "Commonality") to the
comparable factors as listed in Appendix B. Second, in
the boxes under "Detailed Analysis" and "How to Use", the
references are to specific objectives within the factor
named "Objectives" as listed in Appendix B. Finally, the
diamond shaped decision boxes identify the major decisions
which control the process.
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The initial point in the model, marked as START, assumes
the existence of a specific decision maker (i.e., a specific
acquisition or contracting manager) with some interest in
considering the use of leader/follower for some specific
program. The ending points in the model, marked as END,
identify the several formal points at which use of the
model may be terminated.
The first of the two basic decision areas, "Whether to Use",
consists of two stages: first, a brief look, or "preliminary
analysis", to determine whether or not the feasibility
and/or desirability of leader/follower is sufficient to
warrant a more extensive and detailed analysis; second, a
"detailed analysis". The "preliminary analysis" is, it-
self, in two parts: first, an examination of (primarily)
three factors to determine if development or establishment
of a second source is feasible and/or desirable; second,
an examination which includes three additional factors to
determine if use of leader/follower is feasible and/or
desirable. If warranted by the previous stage, a more
"detailed analysis" is then carried out, depending upon
which of several objectives is the primary purpose to be
achieved.
The second basic decision area is "How to Use" leader/
follower. This, again, will draw upon the previous analyses,
and deals with key questions, including timing, form of
contractual arrangements, incentives to assure the transfer
of manufacturing assistance and know-how, and other
considerations
.
C. Second Source Decision
The reason for considering the decision to second
source first is that the issue of leader/follower doesn't
arise unless there is the necessity for establishing a
second source. In the early planning the decision on the
number of sources to be developed may have been assumed or
otherwise established; this may be a function of the nature
of the procurement, e.g., small, one-shot buys, off-the-
shelf commercial products, or of the assumptions and
circumstances during the establishment of the program.
Where the question has not been settled, the decision is
likely to be sensitive to three interacting factors. The
first factor is the presence of some objective which will
be advanced (or which can only be achieved) by developing
a second source; while there may be several objectives,
the most likely ones are achievement of some advantage in
the cost (of the production buy) and assurance of supply.
These objectives are, in turn, sensitive to the second
factor, the characteristics of the procurement, and.
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particularly, the size and the schedule. The third factor,
time, enters in a least two ways: first, whether the time
needed to develop a second source is available in the
light of the previous two factors, and second, whether this
decision is being considered early enough to allow intro-
duction consistent with the time needed. There are other
factors which may affect this decision, the most important
of which is probably in the form of strong policy guidance.
D. Leader/follower Decision
If, and only if, the previous decision were to
develop a source, preliminary consideration of leader/
follower becomes necessary. For purposes of this decision,
three additional factors are of particular significance.
The first factor, commonality, tends to be assumed, but is
essential; if items to be procured from multiple sources
are only required to meet minimal functional requirements,
i.e., "form, fit, and function", there may be little or no
necessity (and it may be, in fact, undesirable) to insist
upon a transfer of manufacturing information from one
producer to another. The second factor, the reprocurement
data base, is probably the most critical determinant of the
feasibility and/or desirability of leader/follower. If
the available (or expected) data base is "so complete"
that potential second sources can be expected to produce
and/or compete without "extraordinary" assistance from the
original developer/producer, there is no need for leader/
follower; if, in contrast, the data base is so inadequate
(or the product is so novel and difficult to produce) that
the original developer/producer will be stretched to put
it into production himself, leader/follower will not only
be impractical (or infeasible) but may also interfere with
the original production run. Only in the "middle area"
where the second source can (only) be put in a position
to produce and/or compete through "extraordinary assistance"
is leader/follower indicated. This introduces the third
factor, characteristics of (potential) contractors, the
(potential) willingness and ability of the leader and the
follower. Other factors or considerations may include use
of alternative techniques such as breakout or directed
licensing.
E. Detailed Analysis - Cost
If the preliminary analysis indicates the likelihood
that use of leader/follower for development of a second
source is feasible and desirable, the next stage is to
examine the question in more detail, and, for this prupose,
it is convenient to conduct the analysis on the basis of
the specific (primary) objective under consideration.
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The achievement of savings in the cost of the production
quantities requires, essentially, a comparison of cost of
sole source with cost of second (or two or multiple)
sourcing. On one hand is the estimated cost saving to be
obtained through price competition, usually on that part
of the production buy which remains after the second source
is able to produce and/or compete. On the other hand are
those costs associated with establishing the second source
—
administrative costs to the government, cost of the services
provided by the leader to the follower, start-up costs of
the follower, i.e., an "educational buy". For programs
with very large quantities and extended production runs,
it is more likely that cost savings will be realized,
F. Detailed Analysis - Availability
The objective of availability (or assurance of
supply) is probably the original and/or primary basis for
the development of the second sourcing technique of
leader/follower, i.e., the development or establishment of
a mobilization base. In the absence of such a specific
requirement, two other forms of availability appear. First,
where the quantities scheduled exceed the present capability
or capacity of a single producer, e.g., a shipyard; second,
where circumstances are anticipated which may change or
otherwise interfere with the developer/producer's ability
(or willingness) to produce within the planned (or desired)
parameters of performance, cost, and schedule throughout
the duration of the program. Analysis of the first case
may be relatively straightforward if the initial (or early)
production schedule is clearly inconsistent with the capacity
of a single producer; where the schedule buildup is con-
sistent with leadtimes necessary to expand facilities and
staff, an experienced and stable producer may well argue
that availability is not an issue. The second case is
more likely to involve "prudent judgment"—is the facility
"vulnerable" to environmental assault or local labor con-
ditions; is the producer capable of building up and main-
taining the desired production rate; is management stable
and responsible. In either case, the objective of avail-
ability essentially requires the establishment of more
than one source as "sole source" and maintaining that
condition over a period of time.
G. Detailed Analysis - "Other"
Each of the previous objectives may appear, to
some degree, in conjunction with the other, or with any
of several additonal objectives. Where some objective
other than cost or availability is the primary objective.
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the analysis may vary from very brief to extensive.
Commonality, or an interest in improving the quality of
the product, may involve detailed consideration not only
of technical design options, but also the overall useful
life of the product—operations, training, maintenance,
logistics, life cycle costs, etc. Socio-economic objectives,
e.g., participation by minority enterprises, and responding
to policy directives to "increase competition" may require
little or no analysis.
H. How to Use - Timing
Except where the option to continually reassess
and discontinue is unavailable, it would appear that early
consideration and planning is a dominant strategy; unless
second sourcing and leader/follower are clearly inappro-
priate, early planning not only facilitates later use but
also provides lead time to industry for its planning (and
avoids surprise) . In general, however, early planning may
be difficult because of uncertainty concerning key factors.
Where the objective is cost savings, the actual introduction
of leader/follower, i.e., designating a follower and direct-
ing the leader to provide assistance, may occur relatively
late in the development-to-production phase of the leader.
The later the introduction the more likely the design is
stabilized and the data base available; the limit on delay
is the necessity for having the follower capable of produc-
ing and/or competing while there are still significant
production quantities remaining.
Where the objective is availability, it is usually necessary
to initiate leader/follower at or near the beginning of
the development. If capacity is the issue, it is an initial
condition; if anticipated future conditions is the issue,
delay increases the exposure and, in addition, may increase
the difficulty of introduction.
I. How to Use - Form
The form of contractual arrangement may be direct
or indirect, and may vary during the several stages of the
program. Where the objective is cost, the initial stage of
establishing the second source may be carried out in any of
several ways—through a subcontract from the leader to the
follower, through separate prime contracts (with a con-
tractual provision requiring the leader to provide assist-
ance) , or even a subcontract from the follower to the leader
assistance. During the competitive procurement stage, the
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form may be parallel prime contracts or a "winner-take-
all" single prime contract. Where availability is the
objective, any of the above forms may be used, but the
maintenance of multiple sources over extended periods
suggests the eventual use of parallel prime contracts.
J. How to Use - Incentives
A wide variety of incentives are available, depend-
ing upon the purpose to be achieved and upon the circumstances
of the parties. The key, specific incentives are directed
to assuring that the leader provides the requisite manu-
facturing assistance and know-how and that the follower
accepts it. For the leader, in addition to recompense for
his services, financial incentives may be tied to progress
payments and to production delivery. Inspection, testing,
and validation requirements can be used to determine whether
the assistance has been successful, and various types of
in-process review may be used.
K. How to Use - " Other "
Because leader/follower is a specialized technique
within the overall procurement process, many methods and
techniques may be applicable. Particularly where cost is
a primary or secondary issue, cost containment methods will
be applicable. Issues of commonality suggest the use of






























This appendix presents the Licensing Agreement that
Williams Research Corporation (WRC) and Joint Cruise Missile
Office (the Government) signed. In this agreement, WRC
agreed to license a second source for the production of the
Cruise Missile Engine F-107.
WHEREAS, Section J-18 of Contract N00019-78-C-0206 pro-
vides that a determiniation of rights in technical data
nd computer software for the F107 series engine may be
accomplished when deemed desireable or necessary by the
parties: and
WHEREAS, the Government and WRC desire to establish a
second source (hereinafter to be referred to as "the
Licensee") for the manufacture of engines with the goal
of duplicate sources for all of the items listed on the
Manufacturing Parts List for Cruise Missile Engine Model
Number F107/ WR19 Report Number 78-142 (as updated from
time to time) ; and
WHEREAS, conditions of establishment of a second source
involve a licensing agreement which will be reflected
in a modification to Contract N00019-78-C0206; therefore
The Government and WRC hereby agree as follows:
1. The parties hereto agree to promptly pursue, in
good faith, the determination of rights in technical
data and computer software in accordance with the clause
of Contract N00019-78-C-0206, Section L, entitled,
"Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software (1977
Apr)". However, the determination of the extent to which
the Government has limited versus unlimited rights to
technical data and computer software will not affect
royalty payments, use of technical data and computer
software, or any other conditions as agreed to herein.
2. The use by the Government of technical data or
computer software delivered to the Government to estab-
lish another domestic source other than the Licensee of
the F107 engine without the technical assistance of the
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Contractor is not precluded by this agreement. Any
agreement covering another domestic source other than
the Licensee and royalties or payments due the Contrac-
tor thereunder will be affected by the aforementioned
determination of rights in technical data and computer
software. Should the determination of rights result in
the Government agreeing that certain technical data and
computer software is subject to limited rights, the
Government may acquire unlimited rights in such limited
rights data.
3. Prior to completion of the aforementioned deter-
mination of rights in technical data and computer soft-
ware, the Government has the right to use any limited
rights technical data and computer software furnished
to the Government for purposes of procuring F107 engines,
directly derived versions of the engine, and associated
logistic items for cruise missiles from the Licensee.
4. Notwithstanding Paragraph 3, the Government will
only procure F107 engines and associated logistic items
directly from the Licensee which are in excess of the
Contractor's ability to satisfy either the quantity or
schedule requirement of the Cruise Missile Program or to
produce at a reasonable price. This does not preclude
the use of unlimited rights technical data or software
for direct procurement of associated logistic items from
the Licensee or any other source.
5. For F107 engine procurements by the Government
that exceed an average of 20 engines per month (240 in
a given year) , the Government may at its option procure
direct (pursuant to Paragraph 4) from the Licensee or
direct the Contractor to procure from the Licensee,
complete engines in a quantity up to 75 percent of the
engines delivered to the Government in excess of the
20 per month average to the extent that total quantities
do not exceed 100 per month average (1200 per year)
.
For that portion of procurements that exceed 100 per
month average (1200 per year) , the Government may at its
option procure direct (pursuant to Paragraph 4) from the
Licensee or direct the Contractor to procure from the
Licensee, a quantity up to 50 percent of said excess.
However, for any quantity which is in excess of the
Contractor's ability to satisfy either the quantity or
schedule requirement of the Cruise Missile Program, the
above limitations shall not apply. This production split
between Contractor and Licensee will be recognized by the
Government regardless of time or quantity limits of
Paragraph 6 pertaining to royalty. Subject to the above
maximums, the determination by the Government as to the
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exact quantity of units to be procured from the Sub-
contractor/Licensee will be at the discretion of the
Government taking into account, but not necessarily
limited to, the paramount factors listed below:
a. Cost/price comparisons between the Contractor
and the Subcontractor/Licensee for varying com-
binations of production within the limits set
forth above.
b. Demonstrated capability to produce quality units
on schedule.
c. Need to maintain a dual production capability in
the interests of National Security.
Where the Government at its option directs the Contractor
to procure complete engines from the Licensee, the Con-
tractor may apply a predetermined rate to the Licensee '
s
sales price to the Contractor in lieu of his normal
General and Administrative expenses and fee/profit
application. This rate will be subject to an advance
agreement for each production buy and will be composed
of General and Administrative expense in the range of3-6 percent and a Fee in the range of 6 - 9 percent,
the combined total of both not-to-exceed 12 percent.
6. Government procurement directly from the Licensee
will be subject to payment to the Contractor a royalty at
rates as follows:
a. Five percent of the sales price to the Government
(excluding royalty) for the first 500 engines
procured direct.
b. Four percent of the sales price to the Government
(excluding royalty) for the second 500 engines
procured direct.
c. Three percent of the sales price to the Government
(excluding royalty) for all engines over 1000
procured direct, subject to time or quantity
limitations stated herein.
d. Five percent of the sales price to the Government
(excluding royalty) of those F107 associated
logistic items procured direct for which the




e. The cost of any components of the engine purchased
by the Licensee from WRC shall be excluded from
the base against which the royalty rate is applied.
With the exception of Foreign Military Sales, royalty pay-
ments shall no longer be applicable after a period of 15
years after the date of the first production procurement
from the Licensee by the Government of the delivery of
6000 production qualified configuration engines to the
Government, whether procured from the Contractor, and/or
the Licensee, whichever occurs first. In the event the
Department of Defense undertakes a Foreign Military Sale
which requires the production of the F107 engine for
cruise missile application in foreign countries, the Con-
tractor will be afforded the opportunity (unless other-
wise prohibited by regulations or law) to establish a
foreign Licensee in the foreign country (s) in general
accordance with the terms and conditions contained herein.
In the event the Contractor is not selected to establish
such a foreign Licensee, the Government has the right
through the use of technical data or computer software
furnished to the Government to establish such a foreign
Licensee subject to payment to the Contractor of a royalty
in the amount of 5 percent of the cost (U.S. dollars) of
the engines produced.
7. The Government shall have the right, so long as
the Licensee is performing as a Subcontractor to the
Contractor, to require the Licensee to disclose and grant
rights to the Government to all proposals, cost history,
projected costs, and other information and data to the
same extent that Statutes, Executive Orders, and the
Defense/Federal Acquisition Regulations require the
Contractor to disclose to the Government in connection
with the performance of Government contracts.
8. Limited to F107 engines, directly derived versions
thereof, and associated logistic items procured from the
Contractor or directly form any Licensee established
pursuant to this agreement. Contractor grants to the
Government an irrevocable, non-exclusive paid-up license
throughout the world under any Contractor inventions,
whether or not covered by patents or pending applications,
used in the manufacture of or embodied in the F107 engines,
directly derived versions thereof, and associated logistic
items. Rights in any patents hereafter acquired by Con-
tractor in the course of performance under Government




9. Notwithstanding competion of Contract N00019-78-
C-0206, the provisions of this agreement shall remain in
effect and apply to all Government contracts for F107
engines, its derivations and associated logistic items




This appendix presents the second sourcing agreement
signed by the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office (JCMPO)
and McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company for the produc-
tion of the Reference Measurement Unit and Computer (RMUC)
and the Inertial Navigation Element (INE) . This appendix
does not present all of the attachments to this agreement
because, in the opinion of this researcher, they are not
germaine to the second sourcing strategy utilized by JCMPO.
This cruise Missile Guidance Set Elements (RMUC &
INE) Second Source Agreement is between Joint Cruise
Missiles Project Office of the Department of the Defense
of the United States Government (hereinafter referred to
as JCMP) , McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (here-
inafter referred to as MDAC) and Litton Systems, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as "Litton")
.
WHEREAS, the Guidance & Control Systems Division
of Litton (hereinafter referred to as "G&CSD") has
designed and developed the Reference Measurement Unit
and Computer and the Inertial Navigation Element (here-
inafter referred to as "RMUC" or "INE") used for the
Cruise Missile Guidance Set;
WHEREAS, MDAC in response to JCMP direction desires
to establish a second or alternate source of manufacture
for the Cruise Missile Guidance Set RMUC and/or INE as
an integral part of the Cruise Missile Program;
WHEREAS, Litton Offers and agrees to the commitments/
guarantees as set forth herein, in consideration of the
MDAC and JCMP acceptance of Litton Systems Canada Limited
(hereinafter referred to as "LSL") as a second source or
alternate source;





A. This Agreement applies to the RMUC and INE for
the Joint Cruise Missiles Project Programs
including but not limited to the nuclear Land
Attack versions of the BGM-109, AGM-109 and
AGM-86.
B. In accepting Litton 's offer, MDAC, and JCMP
commit that no offers will be solicited from,
no award made to and no agreement for support
entered into with any other second or alternate
source for Cruise Missile Guidance Set Elements
utilizing the same generation or general type of
technology as in the cujrent RMUC/INE. These
conditions are restricted to the nuclear land
attack versions of the BGM-109, AGM-109, and
AGM-86. This commitment is also conditioned
that Litton will meet its obligation under this
agreement and that the agreement is not termin-
ated pursuant to any of the provisions of
Section XI herein.
C. G&CSD shall be responsible for the transfer of
the technical capability to LSL and the estab-
lishment of LSL as a qualified second or
alternate source, in accordance with attachment
A. Thereafter, upon request from LSL, G&CSD
shall assist LSL in making any required changes
to designs, manufacturing processes, inspection
processes, or qualification of any alternate
vendors.
D. After the establishment of LSL as a second or
alternate source, it is recognized that G&CSD
and LSL shall work as independent contractors
with neither having any responsibility for cost,
schedule, or performance for the other entity.
E. The abbreviations and designations used herein
shall be per attachment B.
II. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION
A. The costs for disclosure associated with the
technical transfer to LSL of the ability to build
the RMUC and/or INE will not be chargeable to any
subcontract under a MDAC contract with the JCMP
or any government contract.
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B. There shall be no royalty charges or license
fees to MDAC or the JCMP for the transfer of
data, equipment, and capability relative to the
RMUC and/or INE to LSL.
C. Should this Agreement be cancelled, suspended,
or terminated prior to expiration of 10 years
for any reasons other than default by Litton,
LSL or G&CSD or violation by Litton, LSL, or
G&CSD of any contract provision. Law or Regula-
tion requiring cancellation suspension or term-
ination, or should the production quantities of
the Cruise Missile Guidance Set Systems be less
than 4,000 Litton shall be paid by the Govern-
ment for LSL and G&CSD capital expenditures not
previously paid for by the Government in accord-
ance with Attachment C hereto, provided that said
capital expenditure is in accordance with
Attachment C.
III. GROUND RULES
The schedule for the technology transfer to LSL and
the establishment of LSL as a second or alternate
source for production orders is shown in Attachment
A, hereto. MDAC and the JCMP shall be entitled to
review, on a regular basis, both G&CSD and LSL's
progress in meeting the schedule.
IV. LITTON INTERNAL POLICY AND PROFIT MARGINS
A. Litton Defense Systems Group Policy #104, with
regard to acceptable minimum profits, shall be
waived for this program. Litton Corporate
personnel will not participate in any of the
G&CSD or LSL proposal/price reviews nor will
any information which may affect a division's
pricing strategy be disclosed to either division
by Litton Corporate personnel.
B. No profit level greater than ten percent (10%)
shall be proposed by either G&CSD or LSL for
RMUC/INE production pricing proposal purposes
for firm fixed price type contracts. No profit
level greater than seven percent (7%) for cost
plus fixed fee contracts shall be proposed by




C. The parties agree that the concepts and the com-
mitments set forth in this Memorandum of Agree-
ment are based upon two year-multi-year contract
selections.
D. Litton will not allocate workloads between the
G&CSD and LSL.
V. RATE
A. MDAC and/or the JCMP hereby agrees that in imple-
menting this second or alternate source plan in
the FY 80 Production buy, G&CSD shall be awarded
contracts or subcontracts calling for a minimum
production rate of sixty (60) percent of the
annual contract quantity and LSL shall be awarded
contracts or subcontracts calling for a rate of
forty (40) percent of the annual contract quantity.
Table 1 shows the minimum production levels for
both G&CSD and LSL and the balance to be awarded
at Government discretion based on bids for varying
production quantities, subsequent to the FY 80
buy. Average monthly production rate shall be
determined by dividing the yearly contract
quantity by 12.
B. For annual contracts requiring deliveries of less
than twenty (20) systems per month, the minimum
average monthly production rates shall be deter-
mined by mutual agreement of the parties hereto.
C. The determination as to work content beyond the
monthly rate minimums shall be the responsibility
of MDAC based upon the results of its annual
contract selections.
D. The JCMP shall not be obligated to purchase from
G&CSD or LSL any required Tooling and Test Equip-
ment (TATE) , other than that previously authorized
by MDAC under Purchase Order No. Y60011, necessary
to achieve a combined maximum rate of eighty (80)
systems per month from G&CSD and LSL. Attachment
D shows the required production buildup rate for
guidance set elements. Litton will accept a




TATE required to meet each divisions monthly
delivery requirements maybe transferable between
G&CSD and LSL. Duty-free entry by the U.S.
Government to facilitate transfers of the TATE
into the United States is assumed.
VI . SELECTION
A. MDAC shall review annually and after the first
two (2) selections have the right to select one
entity to become the selected source for follow-
on production quantities without regard to the
minimum production rate guarantees if the other
entity is not acceptable based upon performance
or price
B. It is agreed that both the G&CSD and LSL will be
willing to enter into contractual agreements for
RMUC & INE production programs with either MDAC
or the Government. It is recognized that for
each a different contractual relationship may
exist; provided, however, that neither G&CSD
nor LSL will be penalized from a selection stand-
point as a result of the particular contract. As
an example, for selection purposes, LSL and G&CSD
quotations will be evaluated on the same basis as
submitted by each entity without alteration by
higher tier contractors. Pending the technology
transfer and establishment of LSL as a second or
alternate source for production orders, MDAC
will acquire the RMUC and INE from G&CSD.
VII. AUDIT
The MDAC/JCMP shall have the right to audit both
G&CSD 's and LSL's books and records for the purpose
of purchasing RMUC's/INE in support of competitive
proposal evaluation. The MDAC/JCMP will generally
utilize the DCAA to audit G&CSD 's records and the
Audit Service Bureau for purposes of audit verifica-
tion of LSL's records.
VIII . ACCESS TO RECORDS
A. The MDAC/JCMP will be granted access to G&CSD
and LSL plants and directly supplied with relevant
records for the purpose of conducting will-cost





A. The MDAC/JCMP recognizes that Litton may have a
limited and restricted rights-in-data position
pursuant to ASPR 7-104.9 (a) in certain technical
data and Litton developed software. The execution
of this Memorandum of Agreement is in no way
intended to be a transfer of any greater rights
to or title in such data and/or software.
ASPR7-104.9 (b) Notice of Certain Limited Rights
shall be applicable to contractual agreements
with G&CSD or LSL.
B. The parties agree that the MDAC shall have the
right to acquire hardware end items and spare
parts from either G&CSD or LSL. MDAC shall also
have the right to order component spare parts
from other qualified suppliers. In order to
maintain commonality, configuration control and
design, all other requirements, including, but
not limited to, required engineering support,
handbooks, technical information and field level
test equipment, if acquired from Litton, shall
generally be acquired from G&CSD.
X. APPROVALS
A. A Technical Assistance and Licensing Agreement
(TALA) between G&CSD and LSL covering the transfer
of technology of the Cruise Missile Guidance Set
elements and support equipment from G&CSD to LSL
shall be submitted to the U.S. State Department
for approval not later than thirty (30) days after
execution of this Memorandum of Agreement.
B. Prior to submission to the U.S. State Department,
the TALA shall be submitted by MDAC to Joint Cruise
Missiles Project Office for approval. The JCMP
shall assist in expediting the approval of this
said TALA.
XI. TERMINATION
This agreement may be terminated by MDAC or JCMP if
Litton, G&CSD or LSL breach this agreement or if any
purchase order, contract or subcontract related to
the RMUC and INE is terminated for default the rights
and remedies for default shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the respective
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default clauses of the purchase orders contracts
or subcontracts. In the event purchase orders,
contracts or subcontracts for RMUC or INE are
terminated for convenience, cancelled, or suspended,
and the intent of this agreement is frustrated, this
agreement may be terminated by either MDAC or JCMP
with the amounts or amount to be paid as a result of
the agreement limited to that provided for in
Attachment C, Capital Investment Incentive.
XII. EFFECTIVITY
This Agreement shall become effective on the date
signed by all parties.
XIII. DURATION
This Agreement shall continue for a period of ten (10)
years, unless terminated pursuant to the provisions
of Section XI herein.
XIV. CONFLICT WITH REGULATIONS OR LAWS
This agreement is subject to and superseded by any
regulation or Law of the United States. In the event
that any part of this agreement is superseded, then
the agreement is to be altered to reflect, to the
greatest extent possible, the original intent of the
parties to this agreement. If a substantial change
is required, such that the meaning of this agreement
is no longer consistent with the original intent of
the parties, then the agreement shall be terminated.
XV. ENTIRE AGREEMENT
This constitutes the entire Agreement of the parties
and except for current purchase orders, supersedes
and cancels any prior written or oral understandings
applying to this Agreement only. This Agreement may





This appendix presents the second sourcing agreement
signed by the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office (JCMPO)
,
the Naval Avionics Center (NAC) and McDonnell Douglas
Astronautics Company (MDAC) for the production of the Scene
Matching Area Correlation System (DSMAC) . This appendix
does not present attachment A to this agreement because / in
the opinion of this researcher, it is not germaine to the
second sourcing strategy utilized by JCMPO.
This Agreement for production and second-sourcing of
the Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation System (DSMAC)
is between the joint Curise Missiles Project of the Depart-
ment of Defense of the United States Government (hereinafter
referred to as JCMP) , McDonnnell Douglas Astronautics
Company (hereinafter referred to as MDAC) and the Naval
Avionics Center of the Department of the Navy (hereinafter
referred to as NAC)
.
WHEREAS, the design and concept of the Scene Matching
Area Correlator (SMAC) was conceived and developed by NAC
and was subsequently modified by NAC to become DSMAC,
which uses digitized reference maps and a digitized sensor;
and
WHEREAS, MDAC has conducted testing of the NAC-developed
DSMAC concept under its Curise Missile Guidance set contract
with JCMP (in which MDAC has agreed that the Government
shall have unlimited rights in data prepared thereunder)
;
and
WHEREAS, NAC, in response to JCMP direction will build
approximately 42 Block I configured DSMAC (DSMAC I) units
and the Government desires to establish MDAC (commencing
with the first year's Production Buy) and a second source
(commencing with a portion of the first and second year's
production buys) as the production sources of Block II con-




WHEREAS, NAC has design cognizance of the DSMAC concept
selected by the Government for use in the cruise missile;
NOW, THEREFORE, MDAC and NAC and JCMP agree as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
A. This Agreement applies to the DSMAC II for the Joint
Cruise Missile Project including, but not limited to, the
conventional tactical (con-nuclear) land attack mission of
the AGM-109, BGM-109, or any other cruise missile designated
for such a mission. The DSMAC II is defined as a production
improvement of DSMAC which is functionally equivalent to,
and evolved from, the DSMAC I but is significantly smaller
and may offer other improvements over DSMAC I.
B. MDAC shall productionize the DSMAC II under NAC
technical direction and establish a qualified second pro-
duction source. Details of the roles and responsibilities
of NAC and MDAC in this endeavor shall be as set forth
herein and in Attachment A.
C. NAC shall prepare and furnish to the JCMP Level 1
engineering requirements and associated lists (including
drawings, data and softward) which shall provide the
necessary design, engineering, manufacturing, and quality
support information, directly or by reference, to enable
MDAC to prepare Level 2 engineering drawings and associated
lists. Level 2 drawings shall be prepared in accordance
with DOD-D-IOOOB, 28 October 1977.
D. MDAC shall submit to the Government, for review and
approval, within 45 days following signature of this MOA,
a draft subcontract RFP package including sufficient tech-
nical data to allow potential second source subcontractors
to understand the design and magnitude of the work tasks
to the extent necessary to prepare and submit a suitable
proposal. Concurrently, MDAC and NAC shall jointly prepare
a draft Technology Transfer Plan (TTP) detailing tasks and
requirements, showing flow of data and information, and
giving schedules for the transfer of DSMAC production
technology from MDAC to a second source which shall also
be submitted for Government review. JCMP approval of this
preliminary TTP is required prior to release of the RFP to
industry. Government approval of the final version of the




E. MDAC shall prepare and furnish to the JCMP a design
disclosure package (DDP) not later than 16 months after ATP,
including drawings, data and software, which shall provide
the necessary design, engineering, manufacturing, and
quality support information, directly or by reference, to
enable procurement from the second source without additional
design effort or recourse to the original design activity,
of DSMAC II that duplicates the physical and performance
characterisitics of the original DSMAC II design. Engine-
ering drawings and associated lists contained in the DDP
shall be prepared in accordance with DOD-D-IOOOB, Level 2.
The specifications, drawings, data, and software in the
DDP shall be in accordance with the NAC DSMAC concepts as
provided by NAC to MDAC and represent a production design
extension of the DSMAC I. This DDP is subject to NAC and
JCMP approval prior to initiation of production. The
government shall have the option to procure from MDAC or
NAC a Level 3 drawing/procurement package at any time.
F. MDAC shall conduct a competition to select a
second-source subcontractor who will support MDAC in the
preparation of the DDP to the extent necessary to ensure
the suitability of that package for production by either
party. MDAC shall conduct the competitive subcontracting
process using subcontracting procedures previously followed
by MDAC for JCMP programs such as the Common Weapons Control
System. (Such procedures are considered to conform to what
is referred to by the General Accounting Office as the
"Federal Norm.") In order to assure that the process is
fair and conforms to the general basic principals governing
award of contracts by the Federal Government, the JCMP
shall review the MDAC-prepared Request for Proposal (RFP)
,
oversee the conduct of the source selection process
(including the specific source selection criteria to be
used) and review the proposed source selection prior to
the contracting officer granting consent to award of a
subcontract to a selected source. Following source selec-
tion, JCMP shall continue to monitor and oversee MDAC
actions throughout the program.
G. Upon completion of the DDP, fulfillment of the TTP
(described in D above) , and qualification, MDAC shall
certify the second-source subcontractor to become an
independent source of Block II DSMAC production.
H. After the second source has demonstrated a DSMAC II
production capability and is certified by MDAC, then MDAC
and the second source shall sever their contractor/sub-
contractor relationship and shall become independent sources
for production of the DSMAC II with neither having any





A. The costs incurred by a second source related to
technology transfer, qualification, or the development of
the ability to build the DSMAC II will not be chargeable
to a MDAC contract, or any subcontract thereunder, with
^
the JCMP or any other government agency, without specific
JCMP approval.
B. There shall exist no royalty charges or license
fees payable to MDAC, NAC, or the JCMP for the transfer
of technical data, computer softward, equipment, and
capability relative to the DSMAC.
C. The development phase DSMAC II contract through
preproduction is anticipated to be a 3% fixed fee plus up
to 12% award fee. Actual fee for the resultant contract
will be subject to negotiations. The award will be deter-
mined on the basis of technical, cost and schedule perform-
ance by MDAC and the success of the second source in being
able to produce and qualify the DSMAC II. Award Fee shall
not be reduced because of MDAC performance or second
source ability to produce or be qualified due to factors
beyond the control or without the fault or negligence of
MDAC.
D. In consideration for MDAC using its own funds
to initially implement this MOA, the JCMP agrees that if
4000 production units of DSMAC II are not purchased by
JCMP from MDAC within the first seven years of the
effective date of this Agreement the Government shall
reimburse MDAC for a portion of the cost of company funded
DSMAC development. In no case shall the maximum Government
liability under this provision exceed the corporate funds
expended by MDAC or the following amounts, whichever is
less:
Fiscal Year 1980 $500,000
Fiscal Year 1981 $1,000,000
and on until *Liquidation
The above liability shall be reduced by the amount of
1/4000 for each DSMAC II unit delivered by MDAC up to
the 4000th unit.
.
*Liquidation period as defined herein refers to a period
of seven years from signature of this MOA or the time
when procurement of 4000 DSMAC II production units is
attained, whichever comes first.
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IE. If the second second source is not qualified by
the time he is scheduled to deliver the first production
unit and the reasons for his late qualification are within
MDAC's control or due to the fault of negligence of MDAC,
then the following provisions shall apply to protect
government delivery schedules and to incentivise successful
completion of second source qualification:
1. MDAC shall supply additional DSMAC II units
to make up the second-source shortfall, within
4 months of their scheduled delivery dates.
This responsibility shall not exceed the
number of non-competed units the second source
is to deliver each year for the first and
second year of production.
2. The government shall not be required to pay
for these additional MDAC supplied units until
such time as the second source is qualified.
The government's liability shall be limited
to only 50% of the maximum progress payments
to MDAC for the above substituted second
source production units for any particular
fiscal year buy.
3. These units shall not increase the total buy
from MDAC, but shall only constitute a cost
free loan of units until such time as the
second source is qualified.
4. At the sole discretion of JCMP, the right is
reserved to refuse to accept production units
from the second source until that source is
qualified, to refuse to make payment for any
such units, or to refuse to make progress
payments between the time qualification is
scheduled to be complete and the time that
qualification is actually complete.
F. MDAC shall accomplish the DSI4AC II technology
transfer to the selected source in such a manner that the
second source is certified as stipulated in Paragraph III.F
no more than 24 months following; 1) the acceptance of
the purchase order from MDAC, and 2) the successful
completion of the DSMAC II critical design review. Should
this certification not be accomplished within 24 months
JCMP reserves the right to limit payment of award fee to
fifty percent of the development phase award fee pool.
Should the certification be delayed by more than three
months beyond this period JCMP reserves the right to limit
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payment of award fee to fifty percent of the remaining
award fee. JCMP shall not limit payment of award fee as
provided in this paragraph if schedule delay is caused by
factors beyond the control or without the fault or
negligence of MDAC.
G. That portion of MDAC responsibility under the MOA
which is to be funded by the Government shall be as
delineated in the DSMAC II FSED work statement which shall
be a part of this Agreement by reference.
III. GROUND RULES
A. MDAC shall ensure that the technology transfer
and manufacturing processes information is provided to the
selected second source (as a subcontractor to MDAC) in a
timely manner to enable the second source to produce 15%
of the first year's production buy and to compete with
MDAC, as a prime contractor, for a portion of the second
production year and follow-on production buy, if they
should occur.
B. The annual production procurement split will be
as specified in Table I. The criteria for award of the
competed quantity of units shall be as established by
JCMP with MDAC, and second source consultation. The
criteria will include cost, past performance, reliability,
and quality as a minimum. Lack of qualification shall not
constitute grounds not to award any or all of the competitive
portion of the buy to the second source unless the government
determines that the second source is not a "responsible"
source (as "responsibility" is defined in DAR 1-900) . It
is the intention of JCMP to divide the annual competed
quantity of units in an equitable manner as long as both
vendors remain acceptable for technical, schedule, and
cost considerations.
C. JCMP shall have the right to select either MDAC
or the second source to become the sole source for any or
all of the follow-on production quantities for the third
production year and beyond if the othr entity is not
accpetable, JCMP shall have the right to develop additonal
sources of manufacture.
D. Prior to completion of the technology transfer and
the establishment of a second source for production of
DSMAC II, MDAC shall be responsible for DSMAC II production
in such quantities and to specific contractual schedules
as necessary to fulfill the Government's requirements.
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E. None of the above shall preclude the government
from using NAC as a production source should both MDAC
and the second source prove unable to meet the government '
s
required production rate.
F. "Qualification" of the second source shall con-
sist of successful asseptance testing (to the same JCMP
approved ATP used for MDAC DSMAC II units) of at least 2
units and the following environmental testing at the
qualification test levels: 1) Vibration; 2) Temperature
(High & Low); 3) Humidity; 4) Altitude, and 5) Explosive
Atmosphere.
Prior to the above testing, MDAC and the JCMP
shall inspect samples of the hardware and the production
facilities and conduct a Production Readiness Review (PRR)
.
If any unacceptable items are discovered, the second source
and JCMP shall be given written notification immediately
so that corrective action can be completed before the start
of environmental testing.
At the successful conclusion of the above review
and testing, MDAC shall certify that the second source is
a valid production source.
G. It is understood by all parties that no agreement;
including but not limited to Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs)
,
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) , TTPs, Purchase Orders,
Configuration or Program Management Plans, etc.; may be
signed and/or entered into between MDAC and the selected
second source without the expressed prior approval of the
JCMP.
H. JCMP and MDAC shall form a design to cost team to
establish the production cost thresholds, goals and chal-
lenges for DSMAC II. This shall be done in parallel with
the design and development program. The values shall be
established by the time of authorization for pilot produc-
tion using independent, validated cost estimating techniques
Appropriate learning curves shall also be established and
an inflation escalation value shall be established each
year.
I. The DSMAC II unit referred to herein will be





A. MDAC shall productionize the DSMAC II and produce
engineering model units in accordance with schedule I.
B. MDAC shall develop the level 2 production drawings
and produce the flight test, pre-production, and initial
production units in accordance with schedule 2. The first
year's production buy is shown as FY 82 for example only.
C. MDAC shall select and qualify the second source
in accordance with schedule 2.
V. AUDIT
The JCMP shall have the right to audit both MDAC's
and the second source's books and records for the purpose
of validating costs in support of competitive proposal
evaluations. The JCMP will utilize the Defense Cost Audit
Agency (DCAA) , with assistance from the resident or regional
Government administrative office, to audit the pertinent
records.
VI. ACCESS TO RECORDS
The JCMP will be granted access to MDAC's and the
second source's plants and be supplied directly with
relevant records for the purpose of conducting Production
Readiness Review (PRRs) and will-cost studies throughout
the performance of any contracts.
VII. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
A. JCMP and NAC state that the NAC design of SMAC
and DSMAC are Government-owned designs and all rights and
patents are owned by the Government. MDAC states that it
has no proprietary claims to the NAC designs of SMAC or
DSMAC. Any MDAC recommended changes or improvements sub-
sequently incorporated into the basic NAC designs are
subject to Government review and approval. Upon approval,
these changes are to be considered subject inventions*
and the Government shall have unlimited rights* in all
data* covering such changes or improvements and a paid-up
license in any MDAC patents on the subject matter. (*as
defined in DAR)
.
B. The parties agree that JCMP shall have the right
to acquire hardware end-items and spare parts from either
MDAC or the second source. JCMP shall also have the right
to order, or direct MDAC to order, component spare parts
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from other qualified suppliers. In order to maintain
commonality of design, MDAC will be the configuration
control agency for DSMAC II, except for DSMAC-resident
softward. NAC shall have a member (with veto power) on
the MDAC DSMAC configuration control baord.
VIII. TERMINATION
This Agreement may be unilaterally terminated by
JCMP if breached by MDAC. This agreement may be unilateral-
ly terminated by MDAC if breached by JCMP. If any purchase
order, contract, or subcontract related to the DSMAC is
terminated for default, the rights and remedies of the
parties shall be governed by the provisions of the respective
default clause of the purchase orders, contracts, or sub-
contracts. In the event purchase orders, contracts, or
subcontracts for DSMAC are terminated for convenience,
cancelled, or suspended, and the intent of this agreement
is frustrated, this agreement may be terminated by the
JCMP, Any disagreement to the amount or amounts to be
paid as a result of this agreement shall be resolved
pursuant to the provisions of the Disputes Clause of the
applicable contract.
IX. EFFECTIVITY
This Agreement shall become effective on the date
signed by all parties.
X. CONFLICT WITH REGULATIONS OR LAWS
This agreement is subject to and superseded by any
regulation or law of the United States. In the event that
any part of this Agreement is superseded, then the Agree-
ment is to be altered to reflect, to the greatest extent
possible, the original intent of the parties to this Agreement
If a substantial change is required, such that the meaning
of this Agreement is no longer consistent with the original
intent of the parties, then the Agreement shall be
terminated.
XI. ENTIRE AGREEMENT
This constitutes the entire Agreement of the parties
and, except for current purchase orders, supersedes and
cancels any prior written or oral understandings applying
to this Agreement only. This Agreement may be modified
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